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I. Introduction 
 
It is a rather simple question. Is a taxpayer permitted to forego a deduction or credit for which the 
taxpayer otherwise qualifies? Even before it is answered, the question triggers another. Why 
would a taxpayer even dream of ignoring something so wonderful, from a tax perspective, as a 
deduction or credit? As explained in Part II of this article, tax deductions and credits sometimes 
are not as beneficial as one might expect, even to the point of being disadvantageous, for tax or 
other purposes. 
 
The simple question can be asked more succinctly. Are tax deductions and credits, in the absence 
of a specific provision to the contrary, mandatory? Phrased in this fashion, the question might 
tempt some to see the answer in the very asking, much as one can with an almost-as-important 
query, AIs chocolate delicious?@ The urge to begin with the words AOf course@ is too much for 
many to resist. In this instance, though, it is dangerous to assume that deductions and credits are 
mandatory. 
 
For some, the asking of the question is almost a surprise. One might expect that more than eight 
decades of federal income tax law history would leave no basic question unanswered. Yet the 
debate over the permissive or mandatory quality of deductions has twice cascaded through the 
American Bar Association=s TAX-LAW listserv, generating two of the longest-lasting, deep, and 
intense discussions on that list, and attracting at least, if not more, participants than any other 
thread to have made its rounds among its members. Perhaps those two discussions, one in the 
spring of 2004 and the other in the spring of 2006, inspired the two short articles that appeared 
shortly thereafter, one in May of 20041 and the other in May of 2006.2 Neither article, though, 
provides, nor perhaps was intended to provide, an extensive, in-depth analysis of the question. 
 
When numerous tax practitioners invest meaningful amounts of time discussing an issue, it is 
safe to conclude that the issue matters. On that point, there is no disagreement. The issue, though 
periodically moving to the edges of the tax stage in years gone by, is ready to take the spotlight, 
principally because increasing tax complexity has changed the value of tax deductions and 
credits. 
 
The practical relevance of the question is highlighted by the controversy swirling about a 
 
1 Nicole E. Ballard, Cherie J. O'Neil & Donald P. Samelson, AAvoiding Taxes by Avoiding 
Deductions,@ 82 Taxes 45 (May 2004)  
2 See generally Joseph D. Beams & W. Eugene Seago, AWhy Some Taxpayers Benefit from Not 
Claiming Deductions,@ 84 Taxes 43 (May 2006). 
settlement that Boeing reached with the federal government. In July of 2006, Boeing announced 
that it would not deduct $615 million it agreed to pay the government to settle charges that it had 
violated ethical rules in obtaining documents from a rival manufacturer and that it had recruited a 
military weapons buyer in violation of other rules, even though it claims it is entitled to the 
deduction.3 If, as some argue, deductions must be claimed, how can Boeing=s decision to forego a 
deduction it claims is justified withstand scrutiny by the IRS? Does Boeing=s attempt to score 
points in the arena of public relations justify its stance? It isn=t just Boeing, because other 
companies reaching settlements with the government with respect to other types of disputes have 
accepted provisions in the settlement agreement by which they promise not to deduct the 
payments.4 Do these provisions violate the tax law? The core issue addressed by this article has 
been moved into a national spotlight on account of the Boeing situation, and its analysis should 
help answer the specific questions raised in this paragraph, together with the others that arise in 
the course of exploring the matter. 
 
After explaining why the issue exists and is becoming more important, this article will explore 
the various arguments that can be, and have been, raised in support of the proposition that all 
deductions are mandatory and in support of the proposition that only certain deductions, for 
specific purposes, are mandatory whereas the others are optional. The proposition that all 
deductions are optional is untenable under existing law, and thus is discussed only in the context 
of policy options available to legislators who choose to address the issue. The question of 
whether credits must be claimed is not treated separately, but is left to ride tandem with the 
arguments and discussion applicable to the claiming of deductions. 
 
This article concludes that only certain deductions, for specific purposes, are mandatory, leaving 
taxpayers with an option with respect to other deductions and credits. For simplicity sake, this 
position is described as the Amost deductions are optional@ approach. The contrary position easily 
is tagged as the Aall deductions are mandatory@ approach, even though its adherents concede that 
deductions requiring an election are ipso facto optional. 
 
II. Why Turn Down a Tax Break? 
 
A. In General 
 
It is widely believed that tax deductions and tax credits are tax Abreaks,@ that is, they contribute to 
a reduction of a taxpayer=s tax liability. Accordingly, deductions and credits are considered 
 
3 See 
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/07/27/business/27boeing.html?_r=2&ref=business&oref=slogin&
oref=slogin (visited 31 July 2006). 
4 See United States Government Accountability Office, Report to the Committee on Finance, 
U.S. Senate, ATax Administration: Systematic Information Sharing Would Help IRS Determine 
the Deductibility of Civil Settlement Payments 21 (Sept. 2005), 
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d05747.pdf (visited 31 July 2006). 
beneficial to taxpayers, and items for which taxpayers aim some of their planning goals.5
Considerable resources are devoted to making a taxpayer=s transactions Afit@ the definitional and 
other requirements of a deduction or credit. 
 
Yet there are instances in which a tax deduction or credit either is worthless to the taxpayer or 
disadvantageous. Worthless deductions and credits are those for which a taxpayer has no use. For 
example, a taxpayer whose non-business deductions exceed gross income has no use for 
additional deductions, because those deductions would enlarge a loss that cannot be carried to 
other taxable years.  That deductions and credits can be useless is demonstrated by the existence, 
in some states of statutory provisions permitting taxpayers with otherwise useless state income 
tax credits of one sort or another to sell those credits to other taxpayers who can make use of 
them.6
Sometimes, however, a tax deduction or credit can cause a taxpayer=s tax liability to increase. 
Though seemingly counter-intuitive, the complex relationship among various federal income tax 
provisions can have that effect. For example, in some instances, decreases in adjusted gross 
income or taxable income reduce a credit and thus create an incentive to forego a deduction 
because the salvaged credit exceeds the tax savings generated by the deduction. Examples of 
these disadvantageous situations are explored in B through G of this Part II. 
 
At other times, a tax deduction or credit can foreclose a taxpayer, or someone related or 
otherwise connected to the taxpayer, from qualifying for a non-tax benefit. For example, some 
benefit programs require that a person is ineligible if someone else claims a dependency 
exemption deduction for that person. Similarly, taxpayers may want to disregard deductions or 
credits because the cost and aggravation of anticipated routine audits involving these items are 
seen as out-weighing the putative tax benefit. Some taxpayers consider privacy more important 
than a deduction, and other taxpayers may seek beneficial publicity from declining to claim a 
deduction. These and similar situations are explored in H through K of this Part II. 
 
The instances described in B through K of this article are but some of the situations in which a 
taxpayer would benefit in some way from declining to claim a tax deduction or credit. For 
purposes of analyzing the core question, it is not essential to identify every such instance. It is not 
unlikely that continued changes in the tax law not only will create more situations in which 
taxpayers would choose to ignore a deduction or credit, but also will cause some of the presently 
identified circumstances to become moot or obsolete. 
 
B. Alternative Minimum Tax 
 
Under certain circumstances, an itemized deduction can cause the taxpayer=s alternative 
 
5 Other major tax planning goals include qualification for gross income exclusions, deferral of 
gross income, and shifting income to other taxpayers. 
6 See, e.g., Susan Kalinka, ATransferable State Income Tax Credits: Are They >Property= or >Tax 
Items= for Federal Tax Purposes?,@ 33 State Tax Notes 849 (2004). 
minimum tax (AMT) to increase by an amount greater than the reduction in regular tax generated 
by the deduction. In this instance, from a tax planning perspective, a taxpayer is better off 
ignoring the deduction.7 Whether, from a tax compliance perspective, the taxpayer should ignore 
the deduction is at the root of the question this article addresses. 
 
One situation in which a taxpayer=s total tax liability increases on account of a deduction arises 
when four factors are present: taxable income is less than the beginning of the 25 percent 
bracket; adjusted net capital gain exceeds taxable income; taxable income is less than AMTI less 
the AMT exemption; and items that are deductible for regular tax are not deductible for AMT.8
Whether Congress should change this particular glitch is left for others to discuss.9
Another situation, described by an ABA-TAX listserv participant, involved a taxpayer whose 
total tax liability would decrease by $3,560 if the taxpayer ignored $35,600 of state tax 
payments.10 If a deduction is not going to decrease the taxpayer=s total tax liability, and might 
even increase it, is there any point in claiming the deduction? 
 
C. Social Security Benefit Computations 
 
Because social security benefits generally are higher if earned income during pre-retirement years 
is higher,11 there is an incentive for self-employed individuals to understate business deductions 
if the tax reduction afforded by those deductions has less present value than that of the 
anticipated increases in post-retirement social security benefits.12 The IRS takes a dim view of 
this particular strategy,13 as discussed in IX, C, below. 
 
D. Maximizing Deferred Compensation Contributions 
 
Because in most instances the amount that can be set aside in a qualified tax-deferred 
 
7 See Kris Hill, AIn AMT? Even the Capital Gains Rate May Be Higher For You, 103 Tax Notes 
119 (2004). 
8 Id. 
9 See id. 
10 Post by Philip Karpel to ABA-TAX listserv (Apr. 19, 2004), 
http://mail.abanet.org/scripts/wa.exe?A2=ind0404&L=aba-tax&P=R44692&I=-3 (visited 31 July 
2006). 
11 See Social Security Administration, Retirement Planner, http://www.ssa.gov/r&m6.htm 
(visited 31 July 2006) (AHigher lifetime earnings result in higher benefits@). 
12 See Nicole E. Ballard, Cherie J. O'Neil & Donald P. Samelson, AAvoiding Taxes by Avoiding 
Deductions,@ 82 Taxes 45 (May 2004). 
13 Rev. Rul. 56-407, 1956-2 C.B. 564. 
compensation plan by self-employed individuals reflects the taxpayer=s net profit,14 there is an 
incentive for self-employed individuals to understate business deductions if the tax reduction 
afforded by those deductions has less present value than that of the combined present value of the 
deduction for the contribution to the plan and the net present value of the after-tax retirement 
benefits generated by the plan.15 
E. Avoiding Application of Section 183 Not-for-Profit Activity Deduction Limitations 
 
Taxpayers engaging in activities that frequently fail to generate an annual profit sometimes will 
have good reason to forego a deduction so that the activity shows a profit in a sufficient number 
of years to qualify for the presumption in section 183(d) that treats an activity as for-profit if it 
shows a profit in at least three of five consecutive years.16 For example, a taxpayer whose activity 
has shown a profit in two of the preceding four years and a loss in the other two needs to show a 
profit in the current, fifth year in order to avoid retroactive denial of the net loss deducted in the 
two previous loss-generating years. One way of showing that profit is to ignore sufficient 
deductions, and the resulting tax liability on the profit so generated most likely will be less than 
the tax savings generated by the net losses incurred in the two previous loss-generating years. 
Whether the taxpayer is permitted to so act is at the root of the question addressed in this article, 
though, as discussed in VIII, B, below, the IRS appears to foreclose this particular tax planning 
gambit. 
 
F. Maximizing the Earned Income Tax Credit 
 
Because the earned income tax credit reflects a percentage of the taxpayer=s earned income,17 
there is an incentive for taxpayers to ignore deductions as a means to obtaining a much more 
valuable credit.18 Deductions reduce tax liability by an amount equal to the deduction multiplied 
by the taxpayer=s effective marginal income tax rate, but credits reduce tax liability dollar for 
dollar.19 Although many taxpayers attempt to maximize the earned income tax credit by 
 
14 See, e.g., ''403(b)(1), (3), 408(k)(3)(C), 415. 
15 See generally Joseph D. Beams & W. Eugene Seago, AWhy Some Taxpayers Benefit from Not 
Claiming Deductions,@ 84 Taxes 43, 46-47 (May 2006). 
16 See '183(d); Regs. '1.183-1(c). See generally Joseph D. Beams & W. Eugene Seago, AWhy 
Some Taxpayers Benefit from Not Claiming Deductions,@ 84 Taxes 43, 47 (May 2006); Nicole 
E. Ballard, Cherie J. O'Neil & Donald P. Samelson, AAvoiding Taxes by Avoiding Deductions,@
82 Taxes 45 (May 2004) . 
17 '32(a)(1), (b). 
18 See Joseph D. Beams & W. Eugene Seago, AWhy Some Taxpayers Benefit from Not Claiming 
Deductions,@ 84 Taxes 43, 44-46 (May 2006); Nicole E. Ballard, Cherie J. O'Neil & Donald P. 
Samelson, AAvoiding Taxes by Avoiding Deductions,@ 82 Taxes 45 (May 2004) . 
19 See, e.g., Joseph Isenbergh, AThe Foreign Tax Credit: Royalties, Sunsidies, and Creditable 
fabricating and report non-existing earned income,20 the opportunity to increase earned income 
by choosing not to claim deductions is very real.21 As it has with any attempt to maximize social 
security benefits by reducing self-employment deductions, the IRS has rejected this strategy 
because the earned income tax credit cross-references the definition of self-employment 
income,22 as discussed in IX, D, below. 
 
G. Qualifying for Education Credits 
 
Because the section 25A Hope Scholarship23 and Lifetime Learning Credits24 cannot be claimed 
by a taxpayer with respect to whom a section 151 dependency exemption deduction is allowed to 
another taxpayer,25 that other taxpayer can make the credits available to an otherwise qualifying 
taxpayer by choosing not to claim the dependency exemption deduction for that taxpayer. If the 
taxpayer who chooses to forego the dependency exemption deduction has an adjusted gross 
income high enough to reduce or eliminate the amount of his or her dependency exemption 
deduction because of the phase-out,26 that taxpayer has nothing to lose, tax-wise, from foregoing 
what would be a zero or insignificant deduction. As discussed in VIII, A, below, the IRS has put 
its imprimatur on this particular strategy,27 making it impossible to put the IRS into either the 
deductions are mandatory or deductions are optional camps because of its position with respect 
to omitted deductions in the self-employment income computation context. 
 
H. Reducing the Chances of an Audit and Audit Tactics 
 
It is generally believed that many of the taxpayers who choose to forego deductions and credits 
do so because they think that it will reduce the chances of an IRS audit of their tax returns.28 One 
 
Taxes,@ 39 Tax L. Rev. 227, 230 n.8 (1984). 
20 See, e.g., Leslie Book, AThe Poor and Tax Compliance: One Size Does Not Fit All,@ 51 Kan. L. 
Rev. 1145, 1172 (2003) (Ataxpayers may be in the unusual position of creating income@). 
21 Post by Cheryl Collins to ABA-TAX listserv (Apr. 16, 2004),  
http://mail.abanet.org/scripts/wa.exe?A2=ind0404&L=aba-tax&P=R36923&I=-3 (visited 31 July 
2006).  
22 CCA 200022051. 
23 '25A(a)(1), (b). 
24 '25A(a)(2), (c). 
25 '25A(g)(3)(A). 
26 See '151(d)(3). 
27 PLR 200236001. 
28 See, e.g,  See Joseph D. Beams & W. Eugene Seago, AWhy Some Taxpayers Benefit from Not 
commentator references the matter thusly, AHowever, the results of taxpayer surveys suggest that 
a substantial number of taxpayers intentionally fail to take deductions to which they are 
entitled.@29 Even though there is doubt that this taxpayer perception reflects the reality of audit 
selection,30 this approach also triggers the question this article addresses. 
 
For decades, tax practitioners have advised taxpayers and each other that amending a tax return 
to claim an overlooked deduction or to increase a claimed but miscalculated deduction should not 
be undertaken unless the amount involved is so substantial that the tax savings overwhelm the 
alleged increase in chances of audit supposedly caused by the filing of an amended return.31 
Again, regardless of the validity of the Aamended return as red flag@ warning, the question 
addressed in this article can be posed in alternative terms, namely, AMust a taxpayer who 
discovers an unintentionally overlooked or understated deduction amend his or her income tax 
return?@
Another practice involving audits that also relates to the core question is that of bringing 
previously unclaimed deductions to an audit to present to the auditor when the auditor disallows 
deductions that have been claimed on the return.32 If doing so is somehow improper, no one 
 
Claiming Deductions,@ 84 Taxes 43, 46 (May 2006) (AA taxpayer may choose not to claim a 
home office deduction or some other business deduction because she fears it will increase her 
likelihood of getting audited...@); Watson, AAn Analysis of >Meeting or Dealing= for Home Office 
Deductions,@ 1984 U. Ill. L. Rev. 1075, n. 59 (AThere are some negative tax ramifications that ... 
may persuade eligible taxpayers to forego home office deductions. ... For a general discussion, 
see Kennedy & Anderson, Recent Changes Make It Easier to Deduct Costs Related to an Office-
at-Home 12 Tax'n for Law. 18, 21 (1983). See also Everett, Home Office Expense Deductions: 
More Trouble Than They are Worth?, 58 Taxes 589 (1980).@). 
29 Leandra Lederman, ASymposium: Tax Compliance: Should Congress Reform the 1998 Reform 
Act: Tax Compliance and the Reformed IRS,@ 51 Kan. L. Rev. 971, 1001 n. 140 (2003) (citing 
Karyl A. Kinsey, Foreward to Survey Data on Noncompliance: A Compendium and Review, at 
1, 21 (American Bar Foundation, Working Paper No. 8716)). 
30 Post by Jim Maule to ABA-TAX listserv (Apr. 18, 2004), 
http://mail.abanet.org/scripts/wa.exe?A2=ind0404&L=aba-tax&P=R42210&I=-3 (visited 31 July 
2006 (AMy experience tells me that many of the taxpayers who forego deductions do so because 
of misguided notions that it will decrease the chances of IRS audit (something that many 
taxpayers literally fear).@)
31 Post by Jim Maule to ABA-TAX listserv (Apr. 19, 2004), 
http://mail.abanet.org/scripts/wa.exe?A2=ind0404&L=aba-tax&P=R48897&I=-3 (visited 31 July 
2006) (AIn reviewing a return, I discovered an omitted deduction (unintentional). Amending the 
return would have reduced tax liability by a few hundred dollars. The supervising partner told 
me, >Don't amend the return. It's like waving a red flag in front of a bull, and to get attention from 
the IRS for a few hundred dollars isn't worth it.=@). 
32 Id. (AOften, for whatever reason, taxpayers are cautious, and refrain from claiming deductions 
seems to have encountered objections from the IRS.33 Yet there does not exist any specific 
authority endorsing or prohibiting the practice. 
 
I. Keeping Information Private 
 
Taxpayers might refuse to claim a deduction because they do not want the information required 
for substantiating the deduction to be made available to a government agency34 or to a private 
enterprise that examines a person=s tax return as part of a process to determine if the person 
qualifies for a loan, to determine the financial health of a potential investor, or to achieve some 
similar purpose.35 Taxpayers may want to keep private the identity of charitable gift recipients, 
the amount spent on a safe deposit box, the amount paid as alimony, the fact alimony has been 
paid, or the details of medical expenses.36 
J. Public Relation Coups 
 
As illustrated by the Boeing announcement that it would not deduct $615 million it agreed to pay 
the federal government to settle charges that it had violated ethical rules while engaged in several 
business activities, a corporation and perhaps even individuals can Ascore points@ in the media by 
Asacrificing@ deductions that public considers unsuitable, even though the tax law permits the 
deduction. Though in Boeing=s case, giving up the deduction allegedly will increase its tax 
liability, the incentive to make such a Asacrifice@ strengthens when the taxpayer has little or no 
need for the deduction. 
 
K. Qualifying for Non-tax Benefits 
 
Because a variety of non-tax benefits are denied to a potential recipient if a dependency 
exemption deduction is allowed to another person with respect to that potential recipient,37 the 
 
that very likely would be allowed if claimed, challenged, and resolved by a court. Then, when 
audited on other issues, as the IRS "takes away" deductions, the taxpayers reach into their pocket 
and drag out some of the ones held in reserve. I don't like this approach, but I've never heard of 
the IRS proposing penalties on account of the deductions that were not claimed until the audit.@). 
33 Id. 
34 See, e.g., Beatty v. Comr., 40 T.C.M. 438 (1980). 
35 See Joseph D. Beams & W. Eugene Seago, AWhy Some Taxpayers Benefit from Not Claiming 
Deductions,@ 84 Taxes 43, 43-44 (May 2006). 
36 See Post by Jim Maule to ABA-TAX listserv (Apr. 19, 2004) (discussing Beatty v. Comr.), 
http://mail.abanet.org/scripts/wa.exe?A2=ind0404&L=aba-tax&P=R51929&I=-3 (visited 31 July 
2006). 
37 E.g., Post by Cheryl Collins to ABA-TAX listserv (17 May 2006), 
http://mail.abanet.org/scripts/wa.exe?A2=ind0605&L=aba-tax&P=R27761&I=-3 (visited 31 July 
taxpayer who would otherwise be entitled to claim the deduction often has a good reason to 
abandon the claim. As with the education credit qualification discussed in G, above, this is 
particularly true if the taxpayer who chooses to forego the dependency exemption deduction has 
an adjusted gross income high enough to reduce or eliminate the amount of his or her 
dependency exemption deduction because of the phase-out.38 
The benefits that might be available to a taxpayer who chooses not to claim a dependency 
exemption or other deduction include those offered through programs for disaster relief, 
insurance settlements, bank loans, and sales of businesses.39 Whether the tax law would require 
the taxpayer to claim the deduction is at the root of the question addressed in this article. 
Whether the agency administering the non-tax benefit would consider the foregoing of the 
deduction as valid is beyond the scope of this article. 
 
III. Does AShall Be Allowed@ Mandate Deduction? 
 
A. The Words of the Statute: A Road-Map to Nowhere 
 
1. In General 
 
It has been argued by advocates of the Aall deductions are mandatory@ approach that the Internal 
Revenue Code literally requires a taxpayer to claim all deductions for which the taxpayer 
otherwise qualifies because the term Ashall be allowed@ mandates taking the deduction into 
account in computing taxable income.40 This argument rests on a sequential analysis of statutory 
terms ultimately defining taxable income. Predictably, the language of the Internal Revenue Code 
does not provide a definitive answer to the question of whether taxpayers are obligated to claim 
every deduction for which they otherwise are eligible. At best, the language provides some clues 
that assist in finding an answer through implication and inference. 
 
2006) (qualifying for Medi-Cal); ATexas Residency - FAQ@,
http://www.utdallas.edu/residency/fac.html#8 (visited 31 July 2006) (parents not residing in 
Texas and claiming child as dependent cause child not to qualify as Texas resident for tuition and 
other purposes, and thus have incentive to forego dependency exemption deduction). 
38 See '151(d)(3). 
39 See Joseph D. Beams & W. Eugene Seago, AWhy Some Taxpayers Benefit from Not Claiming 
Deductions,@ 84 Taxes 43, 43 (May 2006). 
40 Post by Rod Goodwin to ABA-TAX listserv (16 Apr 2004), 
http://mail.abanet.org/scripts/wa.exe?A2=ind0404&L=aba-tax&P=R37166&I=-3 (visited 31 July 
2006 (ATherefore, the deductions which are allowed, must be taken.@). 
2. Use of AAllowed@ in Defining Taxable Income 
 
a. Taxable Income 
Section 63(a) defines taxable income, with one exception, as Agross income minus the deductions 
allowed by this chapter (other than the standard deduction).@41 The exception defines taxable 
income for individuals who do not elect to itemize deductions, and provides that Ataxable income 
means adjusted gross income minus the standard deduction and the deduction for personal 
exemptions.@42 The adjusted gross income to which this definition refers is Agross income minus 
the following deductions:@43 where Afollowing deductions@ is a list of deductions set forth in 
section 62(a). All but two of those deductions, in turn, are referred to as AThe deductions allowed 
by@ the particular provision for the selected item,44 whereas two are described as AAny deduction 
allowable under this chapter ....@45 
None of this language, though, answers the question. The definitions rest on the concept of 
Adeductions allowed by this chapter@ but that is a term for which no definition appears in the 
Code. Instead, the logical interpretation is that Adeductions allowed by this chapter@ means those 
items for which a provision in Athis chapter@ allows a deduction. There is no issue, of course, 
with Athis chapter@ because section 63 is in chapter 1, and thus Athis chapter@ means chapter 1 of 
subtitle A of the Internal Revenue Code, which deals with ANormal Taxes and Surtaxes.@
b. Allowing Deductions 
 
There are numerous provisions in chapter 1 that allow deductions. The language of those 
provisions adds to the confusion surrounding the issue of whether deductions are mandatory. 
 
A principal provision is section 161, which introduces the litany of deduction provisions 
contained in Part VI of subchapter B of chapter 1. Part VI is captioned AItemized Deductions for 
Individuals and Corporations,@ which is misleading because the word Aitemized@ is being used in 
the sense of Alisting@ and not in the sense of Aitemized deductions@ as defined in section 63(d). 
The latter provision defines itemized deductions as Adeductions allowable under this chapter 
other than the deductions allowable in arriving at adjusted gross income, and the deduction for 
personal exemptions.@ Clearly some of the deductions listed in Part VI are allowable in 
computing adjusted gross income and thus are not itemized deductions within the scope of 
section 63(d). This is one reason that section 7806(b) essentially demands that caption titles be 
ignored for purposes of substantive interpretation.46 A similar definition exists in section 211, 
 
41 '63(a). 
42 '63(b). 
43 '62(a), 
44 See id. 
45 '62(a)(13), (20). 
46 '7806(b). 
which introduces the list of deduction provisions contained in Part VII of subchapter B of chapter 
1. Part VII is captioned AAdditional Itemized Deductions for Individuals@ which by using the 
word itemized is no less misleading than is the caption for Part VI. Another definition based on 
the same pattern exists in section 241, which introduces the list of deduction provisions 
contained in Part VIII of subchapter B of chapter 1. Part VIII is captioned ASpecial Deductions 
for Corporations.@
Section 161 provides: AIn computing taxable income under section 63, there shall be allowed as 
deductions the items specified in this part, subject to the exceptions provided in part IX (sec. 261 
and following, relating to items not deductible).@ Section 211 provides: AIn computing taxable 
income under section 63, there shall be allowed as deductions the items specified in this part, 
subject to the exceptions provided in part IX (sec. 261 and following, relating to items not 
deductible).@ Section 241 provides: AIn addition to the deductions provided in Part VI (sec. 161 
and following), there shall be allowed as deductions in computing taxable income the items 
specified in this part.@ The phrase Ashall be allowed@ also appears in some, but not all, of the 
other deduction provisions in the Code, such as the section 611 deduction for depletion,47 the 
section 642(b) personal exemption deduction for estates48 and trusts,49 the section 643(b) 
charitable deduction for estates and trusts,50 the distributions deduction for estates and trusts,51 
c. AShall Be Allowed@
The critical element of these definitions is the introduction of the phrase Ashall be allowed@ into 
the tax lexicon. The term Ashall be allowed@ is not defined in the statute. Thus, even if the word 
Ashall@ means Amust,@ as some have argued,52 the meaning of Aallowed@ remains determinative 
because whatever it is that must be done is whatever Aallowed@ means. If the word Aallowed@
means Aclaimed@ then Ashall be allowed@ must be interpreted as Amust be claimed,@ making all 
deductions mandatory. In contrast, if Aallowed@ means Apermitted,@ then Ashall be allowed@ must 
be interpreted as Amust be permitted,@ which means that the claiming of the deduction is not 
required. In further contrast, if Aallowed@ means Aaccepted@ or Aapproved,@ then Ashall be 
 
47 '611(a). 
48 '642(b)(1). 
49 '642(b)(2). 
50 '642(c). 
51 ''651(a), 661(a). 
52 See Nicole E. Ballard, Cherie J. O'Neil & Donald P. Samelson, AAvoiding Taxes by Avoiding 
Deductions,@ 82 Taxes 45 (May 2004) (AGenerally, a taxpayer is required by established case law 
and rulings to take all allowable deductions@); Post by Rod Goodwin to ABA-TAX listserv (16 
Apr 2004), http://mail.abanet.org/scripts/wa.exe?A2=ind0404&L=aba-tax&P=R37166&I=-3 
(visited 31 July 2006 (ATherefore, the deductions which are allowed, must be taken.@). 
allowed@ must be interpreted as Amust be accepted@ or Amust be approved,@ making an otherwise 
eligible deduction unassailable if claimed by the taxpayer. 
 
Put another way, the question is whether Ashall be allowed@ means Amust be claimed on the 
return@ or Amust be allowed if it is claimed on the return.@ By phrasing the question in this 
manner, the issue becomes one of determining if the direction in the statute is an instruction to 
the IRS to allow the claim if it is made or is an instruction to taxpayers that the deduction must 
be claimed. 
 
Complicating matters is the fact that the Ashall be allowed@ phrase does not always appear in 
taxable and other income definitions. Sometimes the term allowed is used without Ashall be.@ For 
example, section 832(a) defines insurance company taxable income as Agross income as defined 
in section (b)(1) less the deductions allowed by subsection (c).@53 Section 512(a) defines 
Aunrelated business taxable income@ as Agross income .... less the deductions allowed by this 
chapter ....@ In other instances, the term Aallowable@ is used. For example, section 543(b) defines 
Aadjusted ordinary gross income,@ a component of personal holding company income@ as 
Aordinary gross income adjusted as follows: ... subtract the amount allowable as deductions for 
...@54 Sometimes the term Aallowed@ or Aallowable@ does not appear. For example, section 801(b) 
defines Alife insurance taxable income@ as Alife insurance gross income, reduced by life insurance 
deductions.@55 Rather than supporting the argument that Ashall be allowed@ makes deductions 
mandatory, this potpourri of language formulations adds strength to the position that the 
particular words used to define various types of income do not inform the core question. 
 
3. Impact of the Term AAllowable@
The statutory lexicon is complicated by use of the term Aallowable@ in describing deductions. 
There are numerous provisions using the term Aallowable@ to modify the word Adeduction@ or
Adeductions,@ though a description of a few is sufficient to illustrate the point. 
 
In computing of the section 21 household and dependent care credit, taxpayers are not permitted 
to take into account payments to individuals for whom a dependency exemption deduction is 
allowable to the taxpayer or the taxpayer=s spouse.56 The exclusion for employer-provided 
dependent care assistance does not apply to payments made by the employer to individuals for 
whom a dependency exemption deduction is allowable to the employee or the employee=s
spouse.57 
53 '832(a). 
54 '543(b)(2). 
55 '801(b). 
56 '21(e)(6)(A). 
57 '129(c)(1). 
In computing adjusted gross income, eighteen enumerated deductions that are allowed to the 
taxpayer are subtracted from gross income, whereas two deductions, one for jury pay remitted to 
an employer and the other for attorney fees and costs arising from certain discrimination 
litigation recoveries, are subtracted if they are Aallowable@ to the taxpayer.58 Itemized deductions, 
for purposes of computing taxable income, are defined as deductions allowable under chapter 1 
other than deductions allowable in computing adjusted gross income and the personal exemption 
deduction.59 Impairment-related work expenses, which are excepted from the section 67 two-
percent floor on miscellaneous itemized deductions, are defined as certain expenses of 
handicapped individuals with respect to which a deduction is allowable under section 162.60 The 
reduction of itemized deductions under section 68 applies to Aitemized deductions otherwise 
allowable for the taxable year.@61 
Computation of the exclusion for employee achievement awards depends on whether the cost to 
the employer of the award exceeds or does not exceed the amount allowable to the employer as a 
deduction for the cost of the award.62 Investment interest for purposes of the limitation on the 
deduction of investment interest is defined as Aany interest allowable as a deduction@ under 
chapter 1.63 
The reduction in the adjusted basis of depreciable property is the amount of depreciation allowed 
as deductions but Anot less than the amount allowable@ under the tax law.64 Depreciation 
recapture for personalty applies to Aall adjustments reflected in ... adjusted basis on account of 
deductions ... allowed or allowable ... for depreciation or amortization,65 but if the taxpayer can 
establish that the amount allowed for any period was less than the amount allowable, recapture is 
limited to the amount allowed.66 A similar rule applies to depreciation recapture on real 
property.67
58 '62(a)(13), (20). 
59 '63(d). 
60 '67(d). 
61 '68(a). 
62 '74(c)(1), (2). 
63 '163(d)(3)(A). 
64 '1016(a)(2). 
65 '1245(a)(2)(A). 
66 '1016(a)(2)(B). 
67 '1250(b)(3). 
The use of the term Aallowable@ suggests that the term means something other than Aallowed.@
For example, the statutory provision dealing with the impact of depreciation on adjusted basis 
provides that adjusted basis is reduced by the amount of allowable depreciation even if the 
allowed depreciation is less, a condition that acknowledges not only a difference between the two 
terms but also that a taxpayer may deduct less depreciation than is allowable. Similarly, the 
definition of depreciation that is subject to depreciation recapture also acknowledges the 
difference between Aallowed@ and Aallowable@ but also the existence of situations in which 
taxpayers have deducted less depreciation than was allowable. Sparing a taxpayer from 
depreciation recapture treatment for allowable but unallowed depreciation deductions is 
inconsistent with the notion that Ashall be allowed@ means Amust be deducted.@ The term 
Aallowed@ means something other than a required deduction for all that is allowable. 
 
So in using both terms, Congress clearly implies that they have different meanings. Yet Congress 
did not provide definitions for the two terms. Implications are valuable, but more is required. 
When a statute uses words that it does not define, it becomes helpful to ascertain how the IRS 
and the courts have interpreted those words. 
 
B. IRS Perspectives: A Road Sign of Some Clarity 
 
Decades ago, the Bureau of Internal Revenue, the IRS= predecessor, weighed in with its 
distinction between the terms Aallowable@ and Aallowed@:
The word Aallowable@ designates the amount permitted or granted by the statutes, 
as distinguished from the word Aallowed@ which refers to the deduction actually 
permitted or granted by the Bureau.68 
In reaching this conclusion, the Bureau reasoned consistently with statutory interpretation 
principles set forth by the Supreme Court for terms used in, but not defined by, a statute. 
According to the Court, the meaning of an undefined term must be determined from its Aknown 
and ordinary signification.@69 Put another way, Athe plain, obvious and rational meaning of a 
statute is always to be preferred to any curious, narrow, hidden sense that nothing but the 
exigency of a hard case and the ingenuity and study of an acute and powerful intellect would 
discover.@70 It makes no difference that the term in question is in a tax statute.71 
68 I.T. 2944, XIV-2 C.B. 126 (1935). 
69 Old Colony R. Co. v. Comr., 284 U.S. 552, 560 (1932), quoting Levy=s Lessee v. McCartee, 6 
U.S. 102, 110 (1904). 
70 Lynch v. Alworth-Stephens Co., 267 U.S. 364, 370 (1925). 
71 DeGanay v. Lederer, 250 U.S. 376, 381 (1919). 
Looking to everyday use, something is allowable if it is permissible.72 Something that is 
permissible is something that is an opportunity, and cannot be something that is a requirement.73 
Thus, an allowable deduction is one that the taxpayer is permitted to claim, just as the Bureau 
concluded. All deductions for which a taxpayer qualifies, therefore, are allowable deductions, 
and any attempt to deduct an item that is not allowable, if detected, will be rejected because the 
item is not allowable as a deduction. Logically, therefore, no item can be claimed as a deduction 
unless it is allowable. 
 
What does it mean, then, for a deduction to be allowed? It must mean that something has 
happened to the item in question to move it beyond the character of merely being allowable. 
According to the Bureau, a deduction that is allowed is a deduction that is permitted or granted. 
Barring a mistake or failure to audit a return, the IRS would not permit a taxpayer to deduct an 
item that is not allowable.74 
What matters most from the Bureau=s interpretation, which the IRS has not rescinded, is that 
allowable and allowed are two different concepts. There must be, therefore, allowable deductions 
that are not allowed. Barring an error, the IRS would not, and should not, refuse to a taxpayer a 
deduction that is allowable to the taxpayer. Accordingly, allowable but unallowed deductions 
will exist if the taxpayer fails to claim an allowable deduction. As this article explains, it is not 
unusual for taxpayers to forego allowable deductions. 
 
What necessarily follows is the concept that a deduction does not become allowed until the 
taxpayer does something to trigger allowance of an allowable deduction, by doing whatever is 
required to claim the deduction on the return. In turn, this permits the IRS to accept the claimed 
deduction, thus causing it to become an Aallowed@ deduction or to reject the deduction, thus 
causing it to be Adisallowed@ provided no court holds in favor of a taxpayer who objects to the 
disallowance.  
 
If the taxpayer claims a deduction for an item that is not an allowable deduction, and the IRS 
fails to detect that claim, the item ends up being an allowed deduction even though it was not 
allowable. This conclusion is evident from the provision in section 1016 requiring reduction of 
adjusted basis by the amount of depreciation allowed with respect to the property, though not to 
be less than allowable depreciation.75 If there were no such thing as an allowed but unallowable 
 
72 Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary, http://www.m-w.com/dictionary/allowable (visited 25 
May 2006). 
73 Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary, http://www.m-w.com/dictionary/permitted (visited 25 
May 2006). 
74 See Virginian Hotel Corp. v. Helvering, 319 U.S. 523, 527 (1943) (AIf the deductions are not 
challenged, they certainly are Aallowed,@ since tax liability is then determined on the basis of the 
returns. Apart from contested cases, that is indeed the only way in which deductions are 
Aallowed.@). 
75 '1016(a)(2). 
deduction, the reduction would equal allowable depreciation, for in no instance could the allowed 
deduction be higher. 
 
C. Judicial Examination of AAllowed@ and AAllowable@
The question of how the words Aallowed@ and Aallowable@ relate to each other was expressly 
presented to and decided by the Tax Court in Lenz v. Comr.76 The taxpayers took the position 
that allowable deductions and allowed deductions are different concepts, whereas the IRS argued 
that these terms have the same meaning for purposes of section 163(d) even though they Amay 
have different meanings in other contexts.@ The Court soundly rejected the IRS position: 
 
Throughout the Code, a distinction is made between the terms Aallowable 
deduction@ and Aallowed deduction@, which distinction is not insignificant. Day v. 
Heckler, 735 F.2d 779, 784 (4th Cir. 1984). Unfortunately, as with many terms of 
art in the area of tax law, these terms are often interchanged with one another, 
causing confusion. We must rely on the words of the statute as generally 
understood, and to do otherwise would be to redraft the statute. United States v. 
Locke, 471 U.S. 84, 95-96 (1985). AAllowed@ and Aallowable@ have fixed 
meanings in the tax arena, and we interpret statutes using these terms in light of 
their understood meanings except where to do so would create absurd results. See 
United States v. American Trucking Associations, Inc., 310 U.S. 534, 542-543 
(1940). 
 
AAllowable deduction@ generally refers to a deduction which qualifies under a 
specific Code provision whereas Aallowed deduction@, on the other hand, refers to 
a deduction granted by the Internal Revenue Service which is actually taken on a 
return and will result in a reduction of the taxpayer's income tax. See Reinhardt v. 
Commissioner, 85 T.C. 511, 515-516 n.6 (1985); see also sec. 1.1016-
3(a)(1)(i)(a), Income Tax Regs. Respondent in fact defined the terms Aallowable@
and Aallowed@ in I.T. 2944, XIV-2 C.B. 126 (1935), as follows: 
 
The word Aallowable@ designates the amount permitted or granted 
by the statutes, as distinguished from the word Aallowed@ which 
refers to the deduction actually permitted or granted by the Bureau. 
 
Thus, one might have an item of expense which is allowable as a deduction; 
however, the deduction is not allowed. In Day v. Heckler, supra at 784, for 
example, it was noted that certain land clearing expenses were an Aallowable 
deduction@ under the Code; however, such deduction would not be Aallowed@
unless the taxpayer made an election to take such deduction.77
76 101 T.C. 260 (1993). 
77 Id. at 265. 
The analysis in Lenz has been followed by other courts. In Sharp v. United States,78 the Court of 
Appeals for the Federal Circuit relied on a dictionary definition of Aallowable@ as Apermissible: 
not forbidden or improper,@79 noted that an item can be an allowable deduction even if it does not 
provide a tax benefit, and pointed to the reduction of adjusted basis by allowable depreciation 
regardless of whether the deduction was Aactually taken.@80 In Flood v. United States,81 the Court 
of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit quoted with approval the definition of Aallowed deduction@ set 
forth by the Tax Court in Lenz.82 
What is important about Lenz is not simply the affirmation of the difference between Aallowed@
and Aallowable@ but the surprising attempt on the part of the IRS to argue that the two words had 
the same meaning within the context of section 163. It is this sort of advocacy that contributes to 
the confusion overshadowing the question of whether all deductions are mandatory. 
 
In Reinhardt v. Comr.,83 a case cited by Lenz, the taxpayers= tax liability under the since-repealed 
maximum tax on personal service income84 was in issue. One of the elements in computing that 
limitation is personal service taxable income, defined as personal service income Areduced by any 
deductions allowable under section 62 which are properly allocable to or chargeable against such 
personal service income.@85 The taxpayers had received reimbursement for automobile expenses 
which was properly included in gross income and treated as personal service income. The 
taxpayers, though entitled to claim an offsetting deduction for automobile expenses, did not do 
so, and the IRS did not compel the taxpayers to claim that deduction. However, when computing 
the personal service income maximum tax, the IRS subtracted the automobile expense deduction. 
The taxpayers objected, arguing that Aotherwise properly deductible expenses under sec. 1348 
should be deducted only to the extent such expenses are allowed as deductions for the regular tax 
computation.@86 Though the taxpayers= argument made no sense to the extent that its acceptance 
by the court would increase, not decrease, their income tax liability, the court explained the 
taxpayers= analytical error as follows: 
 
78 14 F.3d 583 (Fed. Cir. 1993). 
79 Webster=s Third New International Dictionary (1986). 
80 14 F.3d at 587-88. 
81 33 F.3d 1174 (9th Cir. 1994). 
82 Id. at 1178 n.5. 
83 85 T.C. 511 (1985). 
84 '1348, as in effect before repeal by Pub. L. 97-34, '101(c)(1). 
85 '1348(b)(2) (flush language), as in effect before repeal by Pub. L. 97-34, '101(c)(1). 
86 85 T.C. at 515, n. 6. 
While we do not see how it helps petitioners, they may be drawing a distinction 
between a deduction "allowed" and one "allowable." Sec. 1348(b)(2) provides in 
part that the term personal service net income means personal service income 
reduced by any deductions allowable under sec. 62 which are properly allocable to 
or chargeable against such personal service income. Whether the automobile 
expenses were allowed as a deduction on petitioners' return is not determinative of 
whether such expenses are allowable as a deduction under sec. 1348. See, for 
example, sec. 1016(a)(2) and sec. 1.1016-3(a)(1)(i), Income Tax Regs., regarding 
the definitional difference between allowed and allowable. 
 
Unquestionably, the use by Congress of the term Aallowable@ rather than the term Aallowed@ in 
now-repealed section 1348(b)(2) demonstrates that the latter word does not mean the former, and 
that for there to be a difference there must exist allowable deductions that are not allowed 
because they are not claimed and thus not allowed. In fact, this is what occurred in Reinhardt. 
The taxpayers failed to claim a deduction allowable to them, and the IRS did not compel them to 
claim that deduction for purposes of computing their income tax liability, even though the IRS 
correctly subtracted the deduction in computing personal service net income for purposes of 
determining the limitation on the taxation of personal service income. 
 
What is important about Reinhardt, and perhaps even more important about Lenz is the notion 
that allowed deductions do not include allowable deductions that do not reduce the taxpayer=s
income tax. In its simplest manifestation, this notion makes sense, for surely it is pointless to 
allow a deduction that leaves the taxpayer=s tax liability unchanged or causes it to increase. Yet 
this notion, as so expressed, does not answer the question of whether a taxpayer may forego a 
deduction that would decrease tax liability in order to obtain some other benefit, for the taxpayer 
or some other person, because the requirement that it be Aactually taken on a return@ begs the 
question of whether the taxpayer is required to claim the deduction on the return. 
 
IV. Lessons from How Unclaimed Depreciation Is Treated 
 
Statutory distinctions between Aallowable@ depreciation deductions and Aallowed@ depreciation 
deductions support both an affirmative and a negative response to the question of whether 
deductions are mandatory. The support provided for the negative response is much stronger, 
though, than what can be gathered for the affirmative answer. 
 
Section 167 provides that there Ashall be allowed@ a depreciation deduction, the computation of 
which is addressed by both that section and section 168. Section 1016 then provides that the 
adjusted basis of the depreciable property must be reduced by the allowed depreciation, but by no 
less than the allowable depreciation, a requirement designed to generate gain if the property is 
sold for an amount inconsistent with the property having decreased in value by as much as the 
depreciation would indicate. 
 
The reduction in section 1016 is equivalent to the greater of allowed or allowable depreciation, 
which suggests not only that there can be allowed depreciation that exceeds allowable 
depreciation but also that there can be allowable depreciation that exceeds allowed depreciation. 
If the phrase Ashall be allowed@ in section 167 means Amust be claimed@ then the distinction in 
the section 1016 reduction would not need to, and could not, exist. 
 
It has been argued that in reducing adjusted basis by the amount of allowable depreciation, even 
if a lesser amount has been claimed and allowed, Congress created a disincentive for taxpayers to 
try preserving adjusted basis by omitting the depreciation deduction when claiming it would not 
provide a tax benefit.87 Though this argument makes sense, it is nowhere as strong as it would be 
had Congress drafted section 1016 to require reduction of adjusted basis by the amount of 
allowable depreciation, plus any excess of improperly claimed and allowed depreciation in 
excess of allowable depreciation. That the section 1016 basis reduction rule reinforces the 
distinction between Aallowed@ and Aallowable@ cannot be denied, but whether it establishes a rule 
of mandatory deductions applicable not only to depreciation but all other deductions is highly 
questionable.  
 
The reason this argument is questionable is found in the depreciation recapture provisions. By 
limiting depreciation recapture to allowed rather than allowable depreciation, Congress 
neutralizes the deterrent effect that the argument attributes to it. By permitting allowable but 
unallowed depreciation to escape ordinary income characterization under the depreciation 
recapture rules, Congress has acknowledged and implicitly approved the instances in which 
taxpayers fail to claim otherwise allowable depreciation deductions. That is not to discount the 
adverse impact on a taxpayer of reducing adjusted basis by the amount of allowable depreciation, 
even if it was not claimed,88 but is intended to illustrate that the adverse impact is far less than 
what it could be if Congress wanted the strongest possible disincentive for failure to claim 
depreciation. 
 
The attempt to rely on the distinction in the section 1016 basis reduction between allowed and 
allowable depreciation deductions to refute the argument deductions are mandatory also has been 
criticized because Congress allegedly was more concerned with Aan allowable deduction that was 
not claimed@ rather than Aan allowable deduction that was not allowed.@89 The statute, however, 
does not refer to allowable deductions that are not claimed but to allowable deductions that are 
not allowed. There is nothing in section 1016 to suggest that there can be unclaimed but allowed 
depreciation deductions. 
 
87 Post by Jeffrey Killen to ABA-TAX listserv (Apr. 20, 2004), 
http://mail.abanet.org/scripts/wa.exe?A2=ind0404&L=aba-tax&P=R55957&I=-3 (visited 31 July 
2006). 
88 See Post by Jeffrey Killen to ABA-TAX listserv (Apr. 21, 2004), 
http://mail.abanet.org/scripts/wa.exe?A2=ind0404&L=aba-tax&P=R62303&I=-3 (visited 31 July 
2006). 
89 Post by Jeffrey Killen to ABA-TAX listserv (Apr. 20, 2004), 
http://mail.abanet.org/scripts/wa.exe?A2=ind0404&L=aba-tax&P=R55957&I=-3 (visited 31 July 
2006). 
V. Seeking Guidance from Legislative History 
 
It has been suggested that the legislative history accompanying the introduction of adjusted gross 
income into the federal income tax law admits of no conclusion other than that deductions are 
mandatory.90 The Senate Finance Committee stated: 
 
Eleventh, the bill introduces a new concept, adjusted gross income. It is defined to 
mean gross income less business deductions, deductions attributable to rents and 
royalties, and losses treated as losses from the exchange or sale of property. In the 
case of an employee, adjusted gross income consists of gross wages or salary less 
expenses of travel or lodging in connection with his employment. It will be seen, 
therefor, that in general adjusted gross income means gross income less business 
deductions.91 
This language, however, does nothing to answer the basic question because no adjective is used 
to modify the phrase Abusiness deductions,@ the word Adeductions@ in the phrase Adeductions 
attributable to rents and royalties,@ the word Alosses,@ or the word Aexpenses.@ There is no more or 
less support for arguing that adjusted gross income means Agross income less allowable business 
deductions@ than there is for arguing that adjusted gross income means Agross income less 
allowed business deductions.@ As has been explained, both Aallowed@ and Aallowable@ are used in 
section 62 to describe the deductions that are subtracted from gross income in order to compute 
adjusted gross income. 
 
The Senate Finance Committee Report also explained: 
 
Fundamentally, the deductions...permitted to be made from gross income in 
arriving at adjusted gross income are those which are necessary to make as nearly 
equivalent as practicable the concept of adjusted gross income, when that concept 
is applied to different types of taxpayers deriving their income from varying 
sources...For example, in the case of an individual merchant...gross income under 
the law is gross receipts less cost of goods sold. Similarly, the gross income 
derived from rents and royalties is reduced by the deductions attributable 
thereto...in order that the resulting gross income will be on a parity with the 
income from interest and dividends in respect of which latter items no deductions 
are permitted in computing adjusted gross income...92 
90 Post by Rod Goodwin to ABA-TAX listserv (Apr. 19, 2004), 
http://mail.abanet.org/scripts/wa.exe?A2=ind0404&L=aba-tax&P=R45427&I=-3 (visited 31 July 
2006). 
91 S. Rep. 885, 78th Cong., 2d Sess. , 1944 C.B. 858, at 859 (1944). 
92 Id. at 877-878. 
Yet again the language does little, if anything, to resolve the question of whether deductions are 
mandatory. On the one hand, a phrase such as Athe deductions ... permitted to be made@ suggests 
that deductions are permissible but not mandatory. On the other hand, a phrases such as Agross 
income from rents and royalties is reduced by the deductions@ suggests that the reduction takes 
place, though the absence of an adjective such as Aallowed@ or Aallowable@ to modify the word 
deductions leaves that phrase no more useful than its counterpart in the first quotation from the 
Senate Finance Committee report. To the extent Agross income under the law is gross receipts 
less cost of goods sold@ is advanced as determinative, the weakness of this language is that it 
does not address deductions. Cost of goods sold is a reduction in the process of computing gross 
income, and thus whatever gloss one wishes to put on the words Ais ... less@ loses its shine when 
it is transferred to the world of deductions. If anything, Congress used the words Aless@ and 
Areduced@ and not the verb Adeduct@ when referring to these reductions, thus highlighting the 
difference between a reduction and a deduction. 
 
VI. The Significance of Deductions Requiring an Election 
 
Determining whether deductions are mandatory is further complicated by the existence of 
Internal Revenue Code provisions that require a taxpayer election as a prerequisite to taking the 
deduction. Even if the taxpayer satisfies all of the other requirements for the deduction, a 
taxpayer can choose to ignore the election and thus forego the deduction. 
 
For example, section 179 permits the taxpayer to elect to deduct some or all of the cost of eligible 
property in the year of its acquisition, in an amount higher than would be deducted using the 
standard depreciation deduction.93 Similar elections exist for the cost of pollution control 
facilities,94 the cost of certain refinery property,95 the cost of qualified film and television 
productions,96 expenditures for the removal of architectural and transportation barriers,97 
reforestation expenditures,98 start-up expenditures,99 environmental remediation costs,100 
corporate organizational expenditures,101 partnership organization and syndication fees,102 and a 
 
93 '179(a), (c). 
94 '169(a), (b). 
95 '179C(a), (b). 
96 '181(a), (c). 
97 '190(a). 
98 '194(a). 
99 '195(b). 
100 '198(a). 
101 '248(a). 
variety of other items a full listing of which is not necessary to demonstrate the point. Individual 
taxpayers deduct itemized deductions if they elect to do so.103 
The existence of these Aby election@ deduction provisions suggests that because Congress has 
provided that for certain deductions taxpayers may choose to elect the deduction or ignore it, the 
necessary inference is that for any other deduction the taxpayer has no such choice. The degree to 
which this logical interpretation should dictate the answer to the question depends in part on the 
purpose of Congress in requiring an election by the taxpayer for these selected deductions. 
 
The election that Congress requires for these selected deductions is more than an expression of 
choice. In every instance, there are specific instructions, provided either in the statute or in IRS 
guidance issued pursuant to statutory authorization, that demand a litany of information from the 
taxpayer. For example, the section179 expensing election requires the taxpayer to identify the 
items of property to which the election applies. This sort of requirement permits the IRS to 
determine if the taxpayer=s other deductions affected by the expenditure subject to the election 
have been properly computed. In other words, these deductions are of such a nature that it is 
insufficient for a taxpayer merely to claim them without providing additional information with 
respect to the specific expenditures that are within the deduction. For deductions not tagged with 
an election provision, omitting the deduction from the tax return does not implicate other 
deductions or create a need for additional information. 
 
Thus, the logical inference that the existence of deductions tagged with election provisions 
means that all other deductions are mandatory is completely counter-balanced by the logical 
inference that election provisions are tagged to those deductions claiming of which would leave 
IRS verification of the taxpayer=s computation of other deductions difficult or even impossible. 
This inference is buttressed by the other conditions that attach to the election provisions. Each 
election provision contains language that directs the IRS to specify the time, manner, and place 
for making the election. These requirements are consistent with the notion that the purpose of the 
election is to give a platform for IRS collection of relevant information rather than to imply that 
all other deductions are mandatory. 
 
102 '709(b). 
103 '63(e)(1). 
Tipping the balance in favor of treating elections as informational platforms rather than as 
indirect imposition of a mandatory character on other deductions is unavoidable when the 
significance of the terms Aallowed@ and Aallowable@ are re-visited. If deductions without election 
provisions are mandatory, then the distinction between allowed and allowable would need to be 
restricted to those deductions. Thus, for example, one would refer to allowable section 179 
deductions, the maximum available to the taxpayer, and allowed section 179 deductions, the 
amount actually claimed, but use of allowed or allowable with respect to section 168 deductions 
would make no sense because under the mandatory deduction approach those deductions would 
be required. Yet the distinction in section 1016 between allowed and allowable when computing 
the reduction in adjusted basis on account of depreciation, and the distinctions in the depreciation 
recapture provisions between allowable and allowed depreciation, do not differentiate between 
section 179 and section 168 deductions. When given the opportunity to treat allegedly mandatory 
and voluntary deductions differently, Congress passed it up. 
 
A closer look at the election to itemize deductions strengthens the argument that existence of the 
election does not resolve the question, and can be viewed as support for the conclusion that 
deductions are not mandatory. The analysis begins with section 63(a) which provides, AExcept as 
provided in subsection (b), ... the term >taxable income= means gross income minus the 
deductions allowed by this chapter (other than the standard deduction).@104 The exception in (b) 
applies to any Aindividual who does not elect to itemize his deductions for the taxable year@ and 
provides that in this situation, Athe term >taxable income= means adjusted gross income, minus (1) 
the standard deduction, and (2) the deduction for personal exemptions...@105 Accordingly, there 
are two definitions of taxable income, one for taxpayers who do not elect to itemize their 
deductions and one for taxpayers who do so elect. 
 
The statutory language for the election of itemized deductions is in the inverse: AUnless an 
individual makes an election under this subsection for the taxable year, no itemized deduction 
shall be allowed for the taxable year.@106 The language does not specify that if the election is 
made, all itemized deductions must be claimed. It simply makes the election a prerequisite for 
claiming itemized deductions. Itemized deductions, in turn, are defined as Athe deductions 
allowable under this chapter other than (1) the deductions allowable in arriving at adjusted gross 
income, and (2) the deduction for personal exemptions...@107 Itemized deductions, therefore, are 
certain allowable deductions, but not necessarily allowed deductions.  
 
104 '63(a). 
105 '63(b). 
106 '63(e)(1). 
107 '63(d). 
Translated, these statutory provisions inform taxpayers that a portion of allowable deductions is 
separated into a group called itemized deductions. No deduction may be claimed for an allowable 
itemized deduction unless the taxpayer makes the itemized deduction election. If the taxpayer 
does so, the taxpayer is free to deduct an itemized deduction, but the taxpayer is not required by 
this language to deduct all allowable itemized deductions. If the taxpayer were required to deduct 
all allowable itemized deductions once the election were made, the language would provide that 
AAn individual who makes an election under this subsection for the taxable year must deduct all 
otherwise allowable itemized deductions.@ Although the language of section 63(d) does not 
specifically state that deductions are not mandatory, neither does the election it describes 
specifically make deductions mandatory. 
 
VII. The Depth of Legislative Grace 
 
The maxim delivered by the Supreme Court decades ago, that deductions are a matter of 
Alegislative grace@108 has been repeated by that Court and others close to two thousand times.109 
Using the word Agrace@ to describe the legislative attitude underlying deductions is inconsistent 
with the notion that deductions are mandatory. Grace in this context means favor, privilege, or 
reprieve,110 all of which are acts that can be offered and rejected. Even from a theological 
perspective, many religious denominations do not consider grace as a mandatory blessing but as a 
gift that can be rejected.111 
Undeniably, many deductions are enacted by Congress as tax incentives, designed to encourage 
taxpayers to engage in particular activities or in some instances to refrain from specified 
activities.112 Although some taxpayers engage in activities that would not otherwise get their 
attention but for the tax deduction carrot dangled before them, other taxpayers would engage in 
those activities even if no deduction was available, because they have other reasons to pursue 
those activities.113 It defies the logic of tax incentives to insist that a taxpayer claim a deduction 
for engaging in an activity because the tax deduction is not necessarily the aim of the taxpayer. In 
other words, offering a reward might trigger a desired result, but it is nonsensical to interpret 
deduction provisions as demanding the acceptance of the reward. 
 
The legislative grace analysis does not persuade everyone. One commentator concluded that 
AWhile deductions are a matter of legislative grace, the language of the code does not seem to 
 
108 New Colonial Ice Co. v. Helvering, 292 U.S. 435, 440 (1934). 
109 E.g., INDOPCO, Inc. v. Comr., 503 U.S. 79, 84 (1992); Interstate Transit Lines v. Comr., 319 
U.S. 590, 593 (1943); Deputy v. DuPont, 308 U.S. 488, 493 (1940). 
110 Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary, http://www.m-w.com/dictionary/grace (visited 25 May 
2006). 
111 E.g., Catechism of the Catholic Church, Article 2, II, 2003, 
http://www.vatican.va/archive/catechism/p3s1c3a2.htm#II (visited 1 June 2006) (AGrace is first 
and foremost the gift of the Spirit...@); The Catechism on the End Times, part 2, paragraph 679, 
http://www.ewtn.com/devotionals/mercy/catechism.htm (visited 1 June 2006) (ABy rejecting 
grace in this life, one already judges oneself...@). Lutheran Book of Concord, Free Will, or 
Human Powers, item 83, http://www.bookofconcord.org/fc-sd/freewill.htm (visited 1 June 2006) 
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http://www.pcusa.org/oga/publications/boc.pdf (visited 1 June 2006) (Awillful neglect and 
contempt of the grace offered to them...@). 
112 See Martin A. Sullivan, AEconomic Analysis: Tax Incentives and Economists,@ 111 Tax Notes 
20 (2006). 
113 See Christopher Bergin, AWhat=s the Incentive for Scrapping Incentives,@ 111 Tax Notes 85 
(2006) (AWhy pay someone to do something they should be doing anyway?@)
make claiming a deduction optional.@114 He reached this conclusion by treating the word Ashall@
in section 63 as Anot may.@ However, as previously explained, the meaning of Ashall@ does 
nothing to prove that the word Aallowed@ means Aclaimed@ rather than Aaccepted if claimed.@ In 
other words, the language of the code does not make deductions a matter of legislative command.  
 
VIII. Lessons from Specific Instances Involving Foregone Deductions 
 
A. Dependency Exemption Deductions 
 
Although the Congress, both in its legislative drafting and its committee reports, offers little in 
the way of unassailable authority on the question of whether deductions are mandatory, the IRS 
speaks volumes when it interprets the dependency exemption deduction. Recall that section 
151(a) provides that A[i]n the case of an individual, the exemptions provided by this section shall 
be allowed as deductions in computing taxable income.@ If the Adeductions are mandatory@
interpretation of the phrase Ashall be allowed@ is accepted as conclusive, the personal and 
dependency exemption deductions are mandatory. Yet that is not how the IRS has treated these 
deductions. Though the IRS could be wrong, its position in this respect is predictive of its 
position on the question generally. 
 
One instance in which the question is significant is the section 25A Hope Scholarship115 and 
Lifetime Learning credits,116 which cannot be claimed by a taxpayer with respect to whom a 
section 151 dependency exemption deduction is allowed to another taxpayer.117 If the value of 
the credit to the dependent outweighs the value of the dependency exemption deduction to the 
other taxpayer, the other taxpayer has incentive to forego the dependency exemption deduction. 
An obvious instance in which this incentive would exist is the other taxpayer having adjusted 
gross income so high that his or her exemption deductions would be phased down to zero under 
section 151(d)(3).  
 
If all deductions that Ashall be allowed@ are mandatory, the taxpayer entitled to the dependency 
exemption deduction would be required to claim it, and the dependent would be foreclosed from 
claiming the section 25A credits. That result, however, is inconsistent with the drafting of section 
25A(g)(3). If Congress intended to preclude all dependents from claiming the section 25A credit, 
it would have used the word Aallowable@ in section 25A(g)(3), namely, AIf a deduction under 
section 151 with respect to an individual is allowable to another taxpayer .... no credit shall be 
allowed under subsection (a) to such individual....@ Evidence that Congress can use the word 
Aallowable@ when it so chooses is found in section 151(d)(2), which states: AIn the case of an 
 
114 Kris Hill, AIn AMT? Even the Capital Gains Rate May Be Higher For You,@ 103 Tax Notes 
119, 121 (2004). 
115 '25A(a)(1), (b). 
116 '25A(a)(2), (c). 
117 '25A(g)(3)(A). 
individual with respect to whom a deduction under this section is allowable to another taxpayer 
... the exemption amount applicable to such individual ... shall be zero.@ In other words, a parent 
who chooses not to claim a dependency exemption deduction for a dependent child cannot, by 
doing so, change the child=s zero personal exemption amount to anything other than zero. If 
Congress wanted that choice to be available it would have used the word Aallowed@ rather than 
Aallowable@ in section 151(d)(2). 
 
Both section 25A(g)(2) and section 151(d)(2) reflect the existence of situations in which 
taxpayers choose to ignore a dependency exemption deduction. Neither provision insists that the 
taxpayer take the deduction that section 151(a) says Ashall be allowed.@ Instead, section 
25A(g)(3) describes what happens if the section 151 deduction is foregone. 
 
The IRS addressed this precise situation in PLR 200236001. The parents chose to forego the 
dependency exemption deduction allowable to them with respect to one of their children. Even 
though the amount of that child=s personal exemption remained zero, that child was permitted to 
take the section 25A credit because no section 151 dependency exemption deduction had been 
allowed to the parents with respect to that child. The IRS concluded that the deduction was not 
an allowed deduction because the parents did not claim it, putting the IRS, in this instance, on the 
side of those who argue that a deduction must be claimed in order to be allowed, and that failure 
to claim a deduction pulls it out of the category of Aallowed@ deductions. The IRS explained: 
 
Congress deliberately chose the Aallowed@ standard for the education tax credit 
because that standard permits more flexibility to a family than does the 
Aallowable@ standard found in '151. See H. Rep. 105-148, 105 Cong., 1st Sess., 
1997-4 C.B. (Vol. 1) 319, 639-640. That flexibility is illustrated by the facts of 
this case. Although neither the taxpayer nor his parents could derive any tax 
benefit from the operation of the '151 rules, his modified AGI was low enough 
that he C although not his parents C could derive some tax benefit from the 
education tax credit. The intra-family allocation of the credit to the taxpayer C
which the parents achieved by not claiming him as a dependent C conferred a tax 
advantage upon the family as a whole, in a manner consistent with Congressional 
intent. 
 
The flexibility to which the IRS refers is the ability of a taxpayer to forego claiming an allowable 
deduction in instances in which the word Aallowed@ is used to describe the deduction. At no point 
in its analysis did the IRS take the position that the words Ashall be allowed@ in section 151(a) 
precluded the parents from foregoing the deduction. 
 
B. Section 183 Not-for-Profit Activities 
 
The IRS also contributes important guidance to the effect of foregoing deductions in its 
regulations interpreting section 183(d). Under section 183(d), an activity is presumed to be an 
activity engaged in for profit, and thus unaffected by the prohibition in section 183(a) on the 
deduction of expenses attributable to activities not engaged in for profit, if the gross income 
derived from the activity exceeds Athe deductions attributable to such activity@ for three or more 
of the five taxable years ending with the taxable year for which the determination is made.118 
There is a more generous provision of two years out of seven, rather than three out of five, that 
applies to certain horse-related activities,119 but that difference does not affect the analysis related 
to the question of whether deductions are mandatory. 
 
As explained in II, E, above, section 183(d) provides an incentive for a taxpayer to forego 
deductions in order to fit within the for-profit presumption. Thus, a taxpayer whose activity has 
shown a profit in two of the preceding four years and losses in the other two needs to show a 
profit in the current, fifth year in order to avoid retroactive denial of the losses deducted in the 
two previous loss-generating years. Foregoing some deductions in order to show a profit would 
make sense if the tax savings from those losses exceeds the tax benefits of the foregone 
deductions. 
 
Section 183(d) does not address the question of whether deductions can be ignored for this 
purposes. The statute simply states, parenthetically, that in determining whether gross income 
from the activity exceeds deductions, the deductions are to be Adetermined without regard to 
whether or not such activity is engaged in for profit.@ That parenthetical language is necessary to 
prevent a loop of reasoning, but it does not define Adeductions@ in any other way. 
 
In regulations, the IRS clarifies the statute by setting forth the presumption in the following 
terms: AIf for ... [a]ny two of five consecutive taxable years ... the gross income derived from an 
activity exceeds the deductions attributable to such activity which would be allowed or allowable 
if the activity were engaged in for profit, such activity is presumed ... to be engaged in for 
profit.@120 By using the phrase Aallowed or allowable@ the IRS, in effect, has accepted the 
existence of allowable deductions that are not claimed, and thus not allowed. If the word 
Aallowed@ means what the Adeductions are mandatory@ proponents contend, the regulation could 
have been written as follows: AIf for ... [a]ny two of five consecutive taxable years ... the gross 
income derived from an activity exceeds the deductions attributable to such activity which would 
be allowed if the activity were engaged in for profit, such activity is presumed ... to be engaged in 
for profit.@ The fact that the word Aallowable@ is joined with Aallowed@ reinforces not only the 
point that the two words have different meanings but also the view that there can exist deductions 
that are allowable but not allowed, namely, that there can be foregone deductions. Of course, in 
this instance the IRS takes the position that foregone deductions nonetheless are taken into 
account in determining whether there is an excess of gross income over deductions that would 
trigger the for-profit presumption. In other words, the taxpayer is free to ignore the deductions, 
but that won=t give the taxpayer any section 183(d) advantage. 
 
This specific issue reached the Tax Court in Dyer v. Comr.,121 involving taxpayers who failed to 
 
118 '183(d). 
119 Id. (last sentence). 
120 Regs. '1.183-1(c)((1). 
121 47 T.C.M. 17 (1983). 
deduct real property taxes and insurance with respect to an activity in order to make the activity 
show a profit so that challenges to the alleged for-profit status of the activity could be forestalled. 
The court noted that A[c]reation of such an artificial profit tends to adversely influence the 
question of profit motive.@122 Significantly, the taxpayer was not required to deduct the otherwise 
deductible expenses but simply denied for-profit status, thus precluding the portion of the 
deductions that exceeded gross income from the activity. The court cited one case,123 but that 
case involved deductions which the taxpayers tried to shift to a different taxable year without 
giving up their claim to the deduction. That case, therefore, adds nothing to the analysis. 
 
C. The Bad Debt Deduction 
 
Section 166 states that Athere shall be allowed as a deduction any debt which becomes 
worthless during the taxable year.@124 In James A. Messer Co. v. Comr.,125 the Tax Court 
explained that Aa taxpayer who fails to deduct a bad debt in the year in which it becomes wholly 
worthless loses the deduction.@126 The court relied on the principle that a taxpayer may not shift a 
deduction that the taxpayer wishes to claim from the year for which it is allowable to a later 
year,127 but concluded that by ordering its affairs with respect to the debt so that the 
worthlessness occurred in a year of the taxpayer=s choosing the taxpayer was gaining a tax 
advantage Anot to be equated with tax evasion@128 where other factors also favored the timing of 
the taxpayer=s actions in seeking foreclosure on the property securing the debt. 
 
122 Id. at ___, n.6. 
123 Brown v. Comr., 36 T.C.M. 77 (1977). 
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127 See Denver & Rio Grande Western R.R. Co. v. Comr., 32 T.C. 43 (1959), aff=d, 279 F.2d 368 
(10th Cir. 1960). 
128 57 T.C. at 862, 
The court=s description of a failure to claim a deduction is not that the taxpayer is compelled to 
file an amended return or otherwise to make the claim, but simply that the deduction is lost. Such 
an outcome is inconsistent with the concept of mandatory deduction, and not only was the 
argument that Ashall be allowed,@ which appears in section 166, means Amust be claimed@ not
presented to, or discussed by, the court, that language did not preclude the court=s description of 
an unclaimed deduction as one that the taxpayer loses. 
 
D. Prior Law Income Averaging 
 
Under the income averaging method of tax computation that was repealed in 1986,129 the 
taxpayer=s taxable income for each of the three taxable years preceding the taxable year for which 
income averaging was applied was part of the income averaging computation.130 In Lynch v. 
Comr.,131 the taxpayers argued that they were entitled to use income averaging even though they 
could not produce a copy of their federal income tax return for one of the three taxable years 
preceding the year in issue. The court accepted the taxpayers= testimony that they searched 
unsuccessfully for the return, and that the accountant who prepared it was dead. The taxpayers 
produced evidence of their income, which was corroborated by evidence produced by the 
employer. The taxpayers, on brief, Astated that they were willing to forego the personal 
exemptions and any other deductions for 1968 to which they may be entitled for the purpose of 
income averaging.@132 The court accepted the taxpayers= testimony and evidence, and ignored all 
deductions in determining the taxpayers= taxable income for purpose of the income averaging 
computation. 
 
It is significant that the taxpayers were not required to claim any deductions, and that their 
taxable income was computed without regard to any deductions. There were no provisions in the 
former income averaging rules specifically defining taxable income for income averaging 
purposes in a manner different from how it is defined generally. If deductions are mandatory, the 
waiver by the taxpayers in Lynch of their deductions should have been rejected. It wasn=t. That 
the taxpayers in Lynch were permitted to forego the personal exemption deduction, despite the 
Ashall be allowed@ language in section 151, was consistent with the conclusion reached in VIII, 
A, above, that Ashall be allowed@ does not preclude taxpayer failure to claim that, or any other, 
deduction barring a specific provision to the contrary. 
 
E. Prior Law Exception to Charitable Contribution Deduction Limitation 
 
Under a long-since repealed provision in section 170, certain taxpayers were permitted to ignore 
the then-in-effect 20-percent-of-adjusted-gross-income and 10-percent-of-adjusted-gross-income 
limitations133 applicable to the charitable contribution deduction.134 A taxpayer qualified for this 
unlimited charitable contribution deduction if, for the taxable year in question and for eight of the 
ten preceding taxable years, the sum of the taxpayer=s charitable contributions plus the income 
taxes paid by the taxpayer exceeded 90 percent of the taxpayer=s taxable income for the year.135 
129 See '1301 as in effect before repeal by Pub. L. 99-514, '141(a). 
130 See ''1301, 1302 as in effect before repeal by Pub. L. 99-514, '141(a). 
131 45 T.C.M. 1125 (1983). 
132 Id. at ____. 
133 '170(b)(1)(A), (B) (as in effect before amendment by Pub. L. 91-172, '201(a)(1)). 
134 '170(b)(1)(C) (as in effect before repeal by Pub. L. 94-455, '1901(a)(28)). 
135 Id. 
In Rev. Rul. 67-460,136 the IRS considered a situation in which a taxpayer, by disregarding a 
portion of the charitable contributions, would cause income tax liability to increase, thus making 
the sum of income taxes plus charitable contributions greater than 90 percent of taxable income. 
The IRS concluded that for purposes of determining if the 90 percent test was met, all of the 
taxpayer=s charitable contributions must be taken into account in computing income taxes paid. 
In GCM 33522, the IRS explained that nothing in section 170 authorized the taxpayer to deduct 
only a portion of charitable contributions when determining total income taxes paid for purposes 
of the 90 percent test, and that doing so would create, in effect, an intermediate deduction 
limitation that does not exist in section 170. 
 
From the General Counsel Memorandum=s careful explanation of the facts and the language used 
in the ruling as it progressed through the IRS, some insight is available. If the taxpayer=s income 
tax was computed after limiting charitable contributions to 30 percent of adjusted gross income, 
the sum of the income tax and the total contributions exceeded 90 percent of taxable income. 
However, this qualified the taxpayer for the unlimited charitable contribution, which reduced the 
taxpayer=s income tax liability to the point where it, when added to total charitable contributions, 
no longer exceeded 90 percent of taxable income. Put simply, there was an algebraic flaw in the 
statute. 
 
In December of 1965, the IRS issued a ruling letter, concluding that if the taxpayer computed tax 
liability by deducting all otherwise qualified charitable contributions, and failed to meet the 90 
percent test, the charitable contribution deduction would be subject to the combined 30-percent-
of-adjusted-gross-income limitation. The flaw was demonstrated by the impact of imposing the 
combined 30-percent-of-adjusted-gross-income limitation, namely, income tax liability could 
increase to the point where, when added to total charitable contributions, it exceeded 90 percent 
of taxable income. The ruling letter stated that there is no statutory authority in section 170 to 
deduct only the portion of total charitable contributions that would generate a tax that, when 
added to total charitable contributions, would exceed 90 percent of taxable income. 
 
136 1967-2 C.B. 123. 
The Office of IRS Chief Counsel concurred in the ruling letter, and the Interpretative Division 
informally concurred on October 21, 1966, in the language of a proposed publication on the issue 
covered by the private ruling letter, even though a proposed General Counsel Memorandum on 
the issue had not been issued because of the deadline for the ruling letter. The proposed 
publication was not approved at the Assistant Commissioner=s Briefing Session held on October 
27, 1966, and the proposed publication was redrafted. When the revision was submitted to the 
Interpretative Division in January of 1967, it identified a possible conflict between the second 
paragraph of the proposed publication and the private ruling letter issued in December of 1965 to 
the taxpayer. The proposed second paragraph stated: 
 
The 90 percent requirement, in the year for which the unlimited charitable 
contribution deduction may be allowable, must be met after applying the 
unlimited charitable contribution deduction in computing the income tax liability 
for such taxable year. Furthermore, the amount of the charitable contributions 
used in determining whether the 90 percent requirement is met must be the same 
amount used as the unlimited charitable contribution deduction in computing the 
income tax liability. 
 
The Interpretative Division thought that this language would Aconvey the impression@ that the 
amount of charitable contributions used to determine income tax liability and to determine if the 
90 percent test was met need not be the actual total charitable contributions but merely the same 
number. It was the disagreement between the ruling branch and the Interpretative Division that 
brought the matter to Chief Counsel. 
 
Chief Counsel explained that its concurrence in the December 1965 letter ruling was based on its 
conclusion that there was no statutory authority in section 170 to compute the 90 percent test 
using only a selected portion of the charitable contributions. The General Counsel Memorandum 
then set forth a second reason for rejecting the use of only a portion of the charitable 
contributions in determining if the 90 percent test was met: 
 
Even if it were assumed that taxpayer could qualify for the unlimited deduction 
(which we could not do, in the face of the express statutory provisions referred to) 
we still could not condone the practice of understating the allowable charitable 
contributions deduction, or any other deduction item, in order to increase 
taxpayer=s tax liability, so as to enable him to claim the unlimited charitable 
contributions deduction. We know of no precedents, and taxpayer cited none, 
establishing that a taxpayer may intentionally understate a deduction item in 
reporting his tax liability for the purpose of gaining a tax advantage. In fact, the 
only authority found supports the opposite conclusion. See Rev. Rul. 56-407, C.B. 
1956-2, 564 to the effect that an individual may not understate his allowable 
deductions in order to increase his net earnings from self employment (which 
would in turn entitle him to larger social security benefits upon his retirement than 
he would otherwise receive had he reported his correct liability).  
 
G.C.M. 33522 then recommended the inclusion of the following language in the proposed 
revenue ruling: 
 
In a taxable year for which the unlimited charitable contribution deduction is 
claimed, the full amount of the taxpayer's charitable contributions must be taken 
into account in computing his income tax liability as well as in determining 
whether the 90 percent requirement has been met. 
 
However, when issued, Rev. Rul. 67-460 used different language: 
 
[I]n a taxable year for which the taxpayer seeks to qualify for the unlimited 
charitable contribution deduction, in determining whether the 90 percent 
requirement has been met, the full amount of the taxpayer=s charitable 
contributions must be taken into account in computing his income tax liability. It 
is not permissible in such computations to take into account only a portion of the 
actual charitable contributions (whether or not such portion is more or less than 30 
percent of adjusted gross income) for the purpose of increasing the income tax 
liability thus computed, and thereby qualifying for the unlimited charitable 
contribution deduction. 
 
The impact of G.C.M. 33522 and Rev. Rul. 67-460 on the broader issue of whether all 
deductions are mandatory or whether only certain deductions, for specific purposes, are 
mandatory, is at best, confusing. Though obsolete, because they deal with computation of a 
limitation no longer in the Code, the Memorandum and the ruling present their own peculiar 
interpretative challenges. 
 
It is essential to note that despite language in G.C.M. 33522 suggesting that no deduction, not 
just charitable contributions, could be understated, the language proposed by the Memorandum 
and the language used in the Rev. Rul. 57-460 does not address the amount of any deduction 
other than the charitable contribution deduction. Something, not disclosed in G.C.M. 33522, 
modified the analysis between the broad statement about deductions generally and the much 
more narrow proposed language. It is not unreasonable to surmise that a statement opining that 
no deduction may be ignored was recognized as inconsistent with the existence of deductions, 
such as the dependency exemption deduction discussed in VIII, A, above, which Congress and 
the IRS contemplate taxpayers may choose to forego.  
 
It is also essential to consider carefully the limited scope of Rev. Rul. 67-460. Its requirement 
that the full amount of the charitable contributions deduction be taken into account applies Ain 
determining whether the 90 percent requirement has been met.@ This is very different from the 
language proposed in G.C.M. 33522, which specifically would have required use of the full 
amount of the taxpayer=s charitable contributions Ain computing his income tax liability as well 
as in determining whether the 90 percent requirement has been met.@ So not only did undisclosed 
analysis water down G.C.M. 33522 from its wide-open assertion that all deductions must be 
claimed to a focus only on charitable contribution deductions, the same, or other, undisclosed 
analysis further watered down the Memorandum from requiring use of all charitable contribution 
deductions in computing both taxable income and the 90 percent test, to a revenue ruling that 
required full use of charitable contribution deductions only in computing taxable income for 
purposes of the 90 percent test. Theoretically, therefore, a taxpayer could then proceed to accept 
denial of the unlimited charitable contribution deduction and claim no charitable contribution 
deduction on the return. 
 
It is likely that what happened is awareness by those involved of the dangers posed when using a 
revenue ruling focused on a narrow issue to proclaim a universal rule of tax law. Perhaps 
someone did point out that taxpayers ignore deductions, and that all the IRS need assert was the 
requirement that all charitable contribution deductions be used in determining if the 90 percent 
test was met. That the likelihood that this is how the scenario played out is reinforced by an 
understanding of what the IRS confronted. A taxpayer had demonstrated the existence of an 
algebraic circle in the application of the 90 percent test, and the IRS chose a reasonable, and 
perhaps the most plausible way, of breaking the impasse. Though the private ruling and the 
proposed, but rejected, public ruling seemed only to require consistency, G.C.M. 33522 and Rev. 
Rul. 67-460 ultimately required consistent use of the full charitable contribution deduction in 
resolving the computational deadlock inherent in the badly-drafted, and fortunately repealed, 
unlimited charitable contribution 90 percent test. 
 
The legacy of G.C.M. 33522 is this sentence: AWe know of no precedents, and taxpayer cited 
none, establishing that a taxpayer may intentionally understate a deduction item in reporting his 
tax liability for the purpose of gaining a tax advantage.@ That the taxpayer did not cite any is not 
surprising, for surely the taxpayer approached the issue as a narrow one analyzing a specific sub-
paragraph of section 170. That the IRS Chief Counsel=s Office did not identify any precedents 
suggests that a quick scan of regulations and rulings did not turn up any useful information. How 
the Bureau of Internal Revenue pronouncement on the difference between allowed and allowable, 
discussed in III, B, above, and venerable even in 1967, escaped notice and discussion is a puzzle. 
Almost all of the other authority that bears on the question of whether deductions are mandatory 
had not yet appeared when Rev. Rul. 67-460 was winding its way through bureaucratic review. 
 
Nonetheless, the significance to be accorded the problematic sentence in G.C.M. 33522 must be 
diminished because it antedates subsequent contrary authority, because the IRS itself has 
subsequently accepted the concept of allowable deductions unclaimed in order to obtain tax 
benefits such as the education credit, because it constitutes dictum, because it did not make its 
way into Rev. Rul. 67-460 nor into the Memorandum=s ultimate recommendation, and because a 
General Counsel Memorandum is not binding authority but simply the opinion of an attorney. 
Worse, G.C.M. 33522 never addressed the Aallowed@ versus Aallowable@ issue that had been the 
subject of analysis by its predecessor Bureau and by several courts, an omission consistent with 
the bizarre argument raised by the IRS in Lenz, as discussed in III, C, above, that the two words 
have the same meaning. Perhaps IRS thinking several decades ago had not yet evolved to where 
it is now, open to the idea, as described in VIII, A, above, that there is no object to taxpayers 
failing to claim an allowable deduction in order to obtain a tax benefit. 
 
In the final analysis, Rev. Rul. 67-460 and G.C.M. 33522 do not resolve the question. Nor are 
they inconsistent with the position that only certain deductions, for specific purposes, are 
mandatory. Were the unlimited charitable contribution deduction still in the tax law, Rev. Rul, 
67-460 and G.C.M. 33522 simply would be illustrators of one more item on what is a very short 
list. 
 
IX. Lessons from the Self-Employment Tax 
 
A. Computing Self-Employment Income 
 
Other than the attempt to construe Ashall be allowed@ as meaning Amust be claimed,@ proponents 
of the Adeductions are mandatory@ view find their strongest support in the treatment of deductions 
for purposes of computing the self-employment tax.137 The analysis involves two decades-old 
revenue rulings, a Chief Counsel Advice Memoranda, and a case. 
 
137 '1402(a). 
In Rev. Rul. 56-407,138 the IRS stated, simply: 
 
The question has been presented whether taxpayers may disregard depreciation 
and other allowable deductions in computing net earnings from self-employment 
for self-employment tax purposes. Held, under section 1402(a) of the Self-
Employment Contributions Act of 1954 (chapter 2, subtitle A, Internal Revenue 
Code of 1954), as amended, every taxpayer, with the exception of certain farm 
operators, must claim all of his allowable deductions, including depreciation, in 
computing his net earnings from self-employment for self-employment tax 
purposes. 
 
After describing how certain farm operators must deal with deductions in light of the optional 
method of computation available to them, and noting that certain partnerships may qualify for the 
optional farm operator computation, the IRS stated, in what appears to be its reasoning: ASection 
208 of the Social Security Act, as amended, provides penalties for a person who makes any false 
statement or representation in connection with any matter arising under the Self-Employment 
Contributions Act of 1954, for the purpose of obtaining or increasing benefits under the Social 
Security Act.@
What the IRS did not state is that failure to claim allowable deductions increases self-
employment income, which in turn increases social security benefits because, within limits, a 
person=s social security benefits are higher if his or her covered income, including self-
employment income, is higher.139 The IRS relied on a specific statute that precludes a taxpayer 
from foregoing deductions for the specific purpose of increasing social security benefits. This is, 
however, only one of the many reasons for foregoing deductions that are described in II, above, 
and does not address the foregoing of deductions for any other purpose. 
 
B. Shifting Deductions for Purposes of Self-Employment Income Computation 
 
The IRS followed up Rev. Rul. 56-407 with another revenue ruling, in which it concluded that a 
taxpayer could not increase self-employment income by having his wife pay his business 
expenses.140 This revenue ruling, however, does not address deductions that the taxpayer was 
giving up, but deductions that the taxpayer was trying to shift to another taxpayer. It is one thing 
to debate whether a taxpayer must claim all allowable deductions, but it is a very different 
question to ask if a taxpayer may shift deductions to another taxpayer. The answer to the latter 
question is sufficiently settled in the negative to make extensive discussion redundant. That 
answer also does nothing to inform the answer to the first question. 
 
138 1956-2 C.B. 564. 
139 See Social Security Administration, Retirement Planner, http://www.ssa.gov/r&m6.htm 
(visited 31 July 2006) (AHigher lifetime earnings result in higher benefits@). 
140 Rev. Rul. 57-538, 1957-2 C.B. 55. 
C. Computation of Social Security Benefits 
 
Almost thirty years later, the question surfaced in litigation over denial of social security benefits 
by the Secretary of Health and Human Resources (HHS), which removed quarters of coverage 
from the taxpayer=s earnings record, thus reducing the amount of her benefits.141 The applicable 
HHS regulation, paralleling section 1402, defined net earnings from self-employment, used in the 
calculation of benefits, as AYour gross income, as figured under subtitle A of the Code, from any 
trade or business you carried on, less deductions attributed to your trade or business that are 
allowed by that subtitle.@ HHS argued that for purposes of computing social security benefits, Aall 
deductions allowed by the tax code must be included when calculating net income -- regardless 
of whether, for tax purposes, such deductions were in fact taken by a claimant.@
Because when HHS acts on its own to remove quarters of coverage from a claimant=s earnings 
record it has the burden of proving it acted correctly, the court noted that the interpretation placed 
by HHS on the applicable HHS regulation, put Aan extraordinary and onerous responsibility on 
the Social Security Administration@ because it requires HHS to be Aa tax expert@ in identifying 
Adeductions which are not taken by a claimant [but] nevertheless ...  included when computing 
net income if they are >allowed= by the Code@ and Aimproper tax deductions@ taken by the 
claimant but not permitted under the tax law. Though the court expressed reluctance to agree 
with an HHS regulation that it considered to be Abased on the dubious premise that there is one 
objectively correct and identifiable set of deductions that apply to a claimant in any given year,@
it accepted the HHS interpretation of the regulation and turned to the question of whether HHS 
had properly applied its interpretation to the facts. 
 
141 Day v. Heckler, 735 F.2d 779 (4th Cir. 1984). 
The Court concluded that HHS erroneously treated as deductions land clearing expenses that the 
taxpayer could have deducted had she elected to deduct them under section 182 but which she 
had not elected to deduct and that absent the election the deductions were not Aallowed@ to the 
taxpayer. To the HHS assertion that the deduction was Aallowable@ and thus should be taken into 
account in computing self-employment income, the court responded with the observation on 
which the court in Lenz relied, as described in III, C, above, namely, AThe distinction between an 
>allowable= deduction and an >allowed= deduction is not insignificant.@ Ultimately, though, the 
court, by dealing with deductions that are allowed only if there is a taxpayer election, did not 
address the more difficult question of whether a taxpayer can ignore deductions not the subject of 
an election. In other words, the court did not approve or disapprove Rev. Rul. 56-407, which, 
surprisingly, was not cited or mentioned. That, however, simply could be a consequence of the 
fact IRS lawyers did not argue the case for HHS. 
 
D. The Earned Income Tax Credit Cross-Reference 
 
Decades after Rev. Rul. 56-407 was issued by the IRS, the Chief Counsel to the IRS, in CCA 
200022051, applied the conclusion in Rev. Rul. 56-407 to the determination of a taxpayer=s
earned income for purposes of the earned income tax credit.142 Because section 32(c)(2), which 
defines earned income for purposes of the earned income tax credit, specifically incorporates by 
reference section 1402(a), the interpretation advanced by the IRS in Rev. Rul. 56-407 for 
purposes of section 1402(a) applies with equal force to section 32(c)(2). The same approach 
would apply to the two other income tax provisions that specifically incorporate by reference 
section 1402(a), the one that defines earned income for the purposes of determining if a self-
employed individual is an employee for purposes of determining if a trust is a qualified 
retirement plan trust,143 and the one that defines earned income for purposes of determining a 
self-employed individual=s compensation for purposes of determining eligibility for simple 
retirement accounts.144 No other income tax provision allowing deductions makes a cross-
reference to section 1402(a). 
 
It is critical to the analysis of the mandatory deduction question to read carefully the first 
conclusion reached in CCA 200022051: AIn cases where the taxpayer reports net earnings from 
self-employment without claiming the applicable business expenses, the net earnings from self-
employment must be adjusted by those business expenses. The taxpayer's EIC and self-
employment tax liability are both computed on the adjusted net earnings from self-employment.@
The conclusion was not stated as an overarching general rule but as a specifically tailored 
analysis focused on two, and only two, situations, namely, computation of self-employment 
income for purposes of social security benefit calculations and for purposes of the earned income 
tax credit. 
 
E. Health Insurance Costs of Self-Employed Individuals 
 
Several years after CCA 200022051 was issued, Chief Counsel considered the section 162(l) 
deduction for medical insurance costs paid by self-employed individuals.145 In CCA 
200623001,146 the Chief Counsel noted that it had previously concluded Athat a self-employed 
individual who is a sole proprietor may deduct, pursuant to '162(l) of the Code and subject to the 
limitations in '162(l), insurance costs for the medical care of the sole proprietor and his or her 
spouse and dependents when the health insurance policy purchased by the sole proprietor is 
issued in his or her individual name rather than in the name of the sole proprietor's trade or 
business.@147 After receiving that advice, the IRS officials seeking it returned to ask Awhether sole 
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147 Id. (emphasis added). 
proprietors may deduct health insurance costs on Schedule C, Profit or Loss From Business.@148 
Chief Counsel provided the answer in these words: 
 
Under '162(I)(4), the deduction shall not be taken into account in determining an 
individual's net earnings from self-employment (within the meaning of '1402(a)) 
for purposes of Chapter 2. Accordingly, the deduction under '162(l) must be 
claimed as an adjustment to gross income on the face of Form 1040. The current 
2005 Form 1040 provides for the deduction on Line 29. Therefore, a self-
employed individual may not deduct the costs of health insurance on Schedule C. 
 
Advocates of the Aall deductions are mandatory@ approach point to the word Amust@ in the second 
sentence of the quoted conclusion as proof that the taxpayer has no choice in the matter, doing so 
by capitalizing the word.149 However, the word Amay@ in the second paragraph of the CCA, Aa
self-employed individual ... may deduct ... insurance costs@ was disregarded and not highlighted. 
If the use of the word Amust@ in connection with the issue of where a claimed deduction must be 
set forth meant that the deduction itself must be taken, the second paragraph would have been 
written Aa self-employed individual ... must deduct ... insurance costs.@ Instead, the CCA states 
the obvious, namely, that section 162(l)(4) prohibits the taxpayer from setting forth any claimed 
deduction on Schedule C because it is not permitted in the computation of self-employment 
income, thus leaving it to be claimed on the face of Form 1040. As one commentator so aptly put 
it: A[A]ll this says to me is that the deduction cannot be taken on schedule C, and that it >must= be
taken, if it is to be taken at all, as an above the line adjustment on the 1040.@150 
148 Id. (emphasis added). 
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Certainly the drafting of the CCA could be better. It would not be precedent, but it would raise 
fewer false hopes on one side or the other of the argument had it said, in effect, either AThe 
deduction must be claimed and it must be claimed on the face of Form 1040" or AIf the taxpayer 
chooses to claim the allowable deduction, it must be claimed on the face of Form 1040.@
Considering the precedent Amay deduct@ language in the CCA, the most reasonable interpretation 
is that the CCA stands for the following proposition: AThe taxpayer may claim the deduction. The 
deduction, if claimed, must be set forth on the face of Form 1040.@ Otherwise the word Amay@ in 
the second paragraph has no meaning. 
 
F. Significance of Self-Employment Income Computation 
 
The attempt to cast Rev. Rul. 56-407 and CCA 200022051 as standing for the proposition that all 
allowable deductions must be claimed fails on two grounds. First, the language in the ruling and 
the Advice Memoranda is carefully drafted to limit its applicability to the computation of self-
employment income for purposes of section 1402 and for purposes of the earned income tax 
credit. It does not state the suggested general rule. Second, if either issuance did state, or could be 
interpreted as stating, such a general rule, it would conflict with the analysis in the Lynch 
decision, discussed in VIII, C, above. The fact that the ruling was not cited in Lynch buttresses 
the argument that its efficacy is limited and its analysis inapplicable to the question generally. 
Similarly, if the ruling or the Advice Memoranda stated, or is interpreted as stating, a general rule 
requiring all allowable deductions to be claimed, it would conflict with sections 1016, 1245, and 
1250, which, as described in III, A, 3, and IV, above, indisputably contemplate and permit 
taxpayers failing to claim allowable deductions. It also would conflict with the IRS= own 
treatment of foregone dependency exemption deductions as described in VIII, A, above. 
 
Thus, Rev. Rul. 56-407 and CCA 200022051 do not provide an answer to the question of 
whether all allowable deductions must be claimed for income tax purposes. They provide an 
answer to a very limited set of circumstances, the computation of self-employment income for 
purposes of section 1402 and the earned income tax credit. That they are drafted in narrowly 
focused terms and not as a general rule suggests that they are exceptions to a general rule. If they 
are in fact exceptions to a general rule, then the position that they take would be the opposite of 
the position taken in a general rule, namely, that a taxpayer is not required to claim allowable 
deductions, a conclusion consistent with statutory analysis, IRS conclusions with respect to other 
areas of the tax law, and several judicial opinions. The self-employment income definition issue 
teaches a lesson, but it is not the one that those who contend all allowable deductions must be 
claimed think it teaches. 
 
X. Intentional Failure to Comply with Deduction Requirements 
 
A. In General 
 
To a certain extent, the question of whether taxpayers must claim all allowable deductions is a 
theoretical one. Although in some instances, the IRS, if it so chose, could detect the existence of 
an unclaimed but allowable deduction, in most situations the information available to the IRS 
would not reveal the existence of allowable deductions that the taxpayer chose to forego. This 
raises five significant practical concerns, discussed in B through F, below. 
 
B. Record-Keeping Requirements 
It is deceptive to consider the record-keeping requirement under section 6001151 as the answer to 
the question. The regulations issued under section 6001 require Aany person required to file a 
return of tax under subtitle A ... to keep such permanent books of account or records ... as are 
sufficient to establish the amount of gross income, deductions, credits, or other matters required 
to be shown by such person in any return of such tax ...@152 The quoted provision begs the 
 
151 See Regs. '1.6001-1(a). 
152 Id. 
question, because it applies to Adeductions ... required to be shown@ but does not identify the 
deductions that are required to be shown. The IRS takes the position that this regulation 
provision permits it to require substantiation of self-employment income for earned income tax 
credit purposes and to permit it to disregard any self-employment income not substantiated by the 
taxpayer.153 The taxpayer must keep records, therefore, only if the deduction is claimed, but the 
proposition that all allowable deductions are mandatory is not compelled by the section 6001 
regulations. 
 
C. IRS Awareness of Allowable but Unclaimed Deductions 
 
Aside from the few types of allowable deductions the existence of which can be detected by the 
IRS, the existence of most allowable deductions comes to the attention of the IRS only because 
the taxpayer has claimed the deduction. Thus, unless on audit the IRS makes inquiries one might 
not expect, such as ADo you have any unclaimed but allowable deductions?@ rather than ADo you 
have any unreported gross income?@ the question of whether allowable deductions must be 
claimed is highly unlikely to surface. This probably explains why there is so little authority and 
so few cases addressing the issue. 
 
The IRS, theoretically at least, is aware of some allowable state and local tax deductions because 
those are reported on Forms W-2 issued to the taxpayer and also delivered to the IRS. The IRS 
also receives copies of partnership, trust, and S corporation returns, including Schedules K-1, and 
thus, theoretically at least, has access to allowable deductions passed through by those entities to 
their partners, beneficiaries, or shareholders. In some instances, issuance of a Form 1099 alerts 
the IRS to the existence of a potential deduction allowable to the payor. These situations, though, 
pale in comparison with the number of transactions that might generate allowable deductions but 
that leave no paper trail for the IRS to investigate unless the taxpayer chooses to make it known 
by claiming a deduction or unless the IRS Acares@ about unclaimed allowable deductions and 
makes inquiries. The latter appears to occur only with respect to self-employment earnings for 
purposes of section 1402 and the earned income tax credit. 
 
It is possible for the IRS to detect unclaimed allowable deductions by conducting a full-fledged 
net worth audit.154 As a practical matter, it would be very difficult for the IRS to prove that net 
worth would have been higher but for an allowable, but unclaimed, deduction.155 One 
practitioner reports that most audit requests focus on proof that the taxpayer paid a claimed 
deduction, and that outside of estate tax and project audits, the IRS has not requested all of the 
checks written by the taxpayer.156 
153 CCA 200022051 (Apr. 6, 2000). 
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IRS reaction to the existence of allowable but unclaimed deductions outside of the section 1402 
and earned income tax credit context was demonstrated in LaForge v. Comr.,157 and Gaines v. 
Comr.158 In LaForge, the court noted that the taxpayer had failed in prior years to deduct the club 
tabs at issue in the case because Ahe was unaware that they may have been deductible.@159 Yet in 
analyzing the deductibility of the expenses at issue, the court did not put into the equation the 
amounts that could have been but were not claimed as deductions, and the IRS did not request it 
to do so. In Gaines, one of the factors taken into account in deciding if the taxpayer=s
understatement of tax was due to fraud was the taxpayer=s Awillingness to give up what would 
otherwise be allowable deductions.@160 Neither the IRS or the Court compelled the taxpayer to 
claim those deductions, but the taxpayer=s decision to forego the deductions was considered a 
factor in proving the taxpayer was trying to hide cash income by doing so.161 
D. Substantiation Failure 
 
Almost all deductions are subject to some sort of substantiation requirement.162 Therefore, the 
easiest way for a taxpayer to push an allowable deduction out of the picture is to ignore 
compliance with the substantiation requirements. For example, a taxpayer could decline receipts 
for traveling expenses. Although the tax law requires substantiation if the taxpayer wants to 
claim a deduction, there is nothing in the tax law that requires a taxpayer to accept receipts for 
traveling expenses. Similarly, a taxpayer who receives an acknowledgment letter from a charity 
is not prohibited from tossing it in the recycling or trash bin. Doing so, of course, negates a 
prerequisite for the deduction that the taxpayer is trying to avoid. Thus, as a practical matter, the 
notion that a taxpayer must claim all allowable deductions loses its force with respect to most 
deductions because the taxpayer=s own actions can make the expense not allowable as a 
deduction. At least two groups of commentators think that some taxpayers, in the words of one 
group, Amay choose not to claim a ... deduction ... because the paper work isn=t worth the amount 
of the deduction.@163 
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That taxpayers are not required to maintain substantiation records but simply are denied 
deductions if they fail to do so is illustrated by Henson v. Comr.164 In that case, the taxpayers 
asserted that they had made cash contributions to their church, offering into evidence a calendar 
with numbers penciled in on certain Sundays. They did not make contributions by check, and did 
not keep any other record, because they described such record-keeping as against their religious 
beliefs. Although the Tax Court estimated the taxpayers= contributions under the Cohan 
doctrine,165 the court stated, ABy choosing, in accordance with their religious beliefs, not to keep 
records of their contributions to the church, petitioners merely chose not to qualify for the 
charitable contribution deduction.@ It is important to note that the court, though allowing the 
taxpayers to deduct an estimated amount, did not compel the taxpayers to keep records nor to 
deduct what otherwise would have been allowable. The Tax Court reacted in the same manner 
when the same taxpayers appeared before it with respect to a subsequent taxable year.166 
The Tax Court=s analysis in Beatty v. Comr.167 corroborates the Henson result, although it 
involved a different deduction and a different taxpayer justification for refusing to produce the 
required substantiation. The taxpayer had claimed a political contributions deduction under 
section 218 as it existed before its repeal by the Revenue Act of 1978.168 The taxpayer testified 
that he had made the contribution, but refused to provide documentary substantiation because he 
considered that requirement to infringe his rights of privacy. The taxpayer stated Athat if 
verification was required of him then he was willing to forego the deduction as the price for 
preventing the government from interfering in his private affairs.@ Rather than compelling 
production of the evidence, or making an estimate under the Cohan principle, the court simply 
concluded that Ait appears that petitioner has conceded this issue, especially since he neither 
requested findings of fact with respect to it nor addressed it in his brief.@ The taxpayer was 
permitted, therefore, to forego the deduction by refusing to substantiate it. 
 
E. The Risk of Fraud and Penalties 
 
Is it possible that deliberate destruction of documents supporting an undesired deduction, or 
failure to request a receipt for an undesired deduction, would trigger a tax fraud prosecution?169 
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Are there penalties for failure to claim a deduction?170 No instance of such a prosecution or 
penalty has turned up. 
 
The absence of fraud prosecutions for failure to claim allowable deductions is not puzzling. 
There are taxpayers who seek to reduce the risk of an audit, despite the low risk of audit faced by 
taxpayers generally, by taking very cautious positions on their returns.171 Even some preparers 
advise against claiming deductions that generate losses because they think Athe IRS is more likely 
to audit providers who show business losses.@172 For example, taxpayers may undervalue 
property donated to charity, or might omit office-in-home deductions,173 knowing that these are 
items that increase the chance of an audit.174 If fraud charges, or even civil penalties, were 
asserted against these taxpayers, the negative public reaction would be rapid and intense. It is 
doubtful anyone would consider these taxpayers guilty of tax fraud.175 
It is not unknown, in the world of tax compliance and audits, for taxpayers to reach into a bag of 
Aallowable but unclaimed@ deductions to replace claimed deductions that are disallowed by the 
IRS during an audit.176 Though one can argue with the strategic value of such an approach, it 
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appears as though the IRS has never proposed penalties on these taxpayers for having failed to 
claim the deductions in the first place. 
 
F. IRS-Prepared Returns 
 
When a taxpayer fails to file a return, the IRS will prepare the return, known as a substitute for 
return, or SFR.177 When preparing an SFR, the IRS uses income information available to it from 
third party reporting, but does not estimate deductions.178 The IRS position is that Adeductions are 
a matter of legislative grace that a taxpayer must establish he or she is entitled to@ and that Ain a 
deduction case, the burden of proof never shifts to the Service.@179 
Though the IRS gives the taxpayer an opportunity to present evidence of deductions to include on 
the return,180 the IRS does not require the taxpayer to do so. As a practical matter, the taxpayer is 
not compelled to claim allowable deductions, and if the taxpayer fails to generate evidence 
proving a right to the deduction, the deduction is not allowed.181 One practitioner reports that 
SFRs Anever have any deductions,@ an observation consistent with the published IRS position.182 
Even when dealing with section 1402, one must wonder if the IRS would insist on manufacturing 
deductions to be reported on an SFR for a non-filing sole proprietor in order to push the 
taxpayer=s self-employment income below $400 so that four quarters of social security coverage 
could be denied to the taxpayer. The long-term benefit to the fisc of reducing the taxpayer=s
benefits, something that might not happen if the taxpayer generates coverage quarters in other 
years, surely is outweighed by the decreases in immediate income tax revenues that would be 
caused by the manufactured deductions. 
 
XI. Policy Considerations 
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Any tax question for which the answer is not unassailably incontrovertible is more sensibly 
analyzed when tax policy considerations are taken into account. With respect to the mandatory 
nature of deductions and credits, the chief consideration should be whether a taxpayer=s omission 
of a deduction would damage the tax system. 
 
If, as a matter of policy, some sort of grave harm would be caused to the income tax system by 
taxpayers foregoing deductions, the existing statutory framework gives no hint of such a concern. 
It would not be unreasonable to add to the Code a provision requiring taxpayers to claim all 
allowable deductions. Such a provision might even simplify the tax law. But whether that ought 
to be done is a totally different question from whether existing law requires such a result. It does 
not. 
 
For example, the tax system is not harmed if a taxpayer, unwilling to disclose the identity of his 
or her favorite charities, chooses to claim no charitable contribution deductions. In such an 
instance, as in many others, the impact on the fisc is an increase in tax revenue. Though the IRS 
will refund to a taxpayer taxes that are overpaid on account of computational errors, there is no 
evidence that the IRS has acted, or would act, to generate a refund based on unclaimed 
deductions, chiefly because the IRS rarely has knowledge that the deduction exists. 
 
There are policy concerns, however, if by ignoring a deduction or credit, the taxpayer=s tax 
liability is decreased, a quirky result possible in what is quickly becoming a less than uncommon 
situation. Three important situations are those involving the alternative minimum tax, the earned 
income tax credit, and the education credit, discussed in II, B, F, and G, above. Ironically, the 
answers for the two for which there are answers diametrically oppose each other. There is no 
question that taxpayers may forego a dependency exemption deduction to make the education 
credit available to the dependent, something that would be done when the deduction=s value to 
the taxpayer is less than the credit=s value to the dependent. There is no question that overstating 
income for purposes of the earned income tax credit is prohibited, and the cross-reference in the 
credit provision to the computation of self-employment income, enacted after the IRS concluded 
that self-employment deductions must not be omitted, suggests that in that narrow instance 
deductions cannot be ignored. In this environment, finding a stable policy benchmark is much 
like trying to walk on jello. 
 
There also are policy concerns when taxpayers forego deductions in order to obtain benefits other 
than tax benefits. Those concerns, however, are not matters of tax policy but questions for those 
designing the benefit program in question. The IRS and the Social Security Administration have 
been unambiguous in rejecting the idea that one=s social security benefits can be inflated by 
omitting self-employment deductions. Yet taxpayers have been known to forego dependency 
exemption deductions not only to qualify the dependent for the education credit, but to establish 
the dependent=s independence for borrowing purposes, or for state welfare and similar benefit 
programs. Any bank, government agency, or state legislature that ties qualification to federal 
income tax reporting needs to determine if it wants the relevant item to be the reported item or 
the item as it would have been reported had the taxpayer, or some other taxpayer, claimed all 
allowable deductions. To this extent, those issues are beyond the scope of the present Article, 
though they certainly deserve study and analysis. 
Another policy consideration involves fairness. A taxpayer who keeps meticulous records but 
determines to forego a deduction makes it easier for the IRS to discover the deduction and, when 
and if it so chose, to demand that the taxpayer claim it. In contrast, the taxpayer whose record 
keeping is sloppy and incomplete is much less likely to meet such a demand. Requiring 
taxpayers, as a matter of policy, to claim all deductions would punish, in some sense, careful 
taxpayers and reward the careless ones. Worse, it would give careful taxpayers an incentive to be 
inattentive and forgetful, to say nothing of Aaccidentally@ throwing out documents. Thus, a rule 
requiring all allowable deductions to be claimed is one that should be adopted, if at all, only 
through a legislative process that involves hearings and debate, and not through some poorly 
written Chief Counsel opinion or poorly argued tax case. 
 
Yet another policy consideration involves legislative competence. In several instances, the 
inducement to forego deductions arises from ill-conceived or badly drafted statutory provisions 
that cause tax liability to decrease if deductions are omitted. Such was the case with the algebraic 
circle masquerading as an unlimited charitable contribution deduction now relegated to what is 
hopefully eternal rest in the tax law=s scrap heap. Making the earned income credit more valuable 
as income increases is yet another example of short-sighted planning. Most importantly, the 
fiasco with the alternative minimum tax, an imposition reaching more taxpayers each year, 
demonstrates the pitfalls of trying to be Atoo cute@ when the drafting of tax legislation becomes 
part of, and enables, the tax game. 
 
Ultimately, the tax policy analysis causes the question to end up close to where it began. What 
difference does it make if a taxpayer chooses to ignore one tax advantage in order to obtain 
another? Put another way, does it come down to a requirement that a taxpayer choose the path 
that leads to the highest tax liability? 
 
The answer may lie in the proposition set forth decades ago by Judge Learned Hand, namely: 
AOver and over again courts have said that there is nothing sinister in so arranging one's affairs as 
to keep taxes as low as possible.@183 Surely a taxpayer can choose to reduce or eliminate 
deductions by failing to qualify for the deduction or by refraining from making a payment. Why, 
then, should a taxpayer be prohibited from ignoring the payment and its qualification as an 
allowable deduction if doing so is not specifically prohibited by a statutory provision mandating 
the deduction?  
 
Consider for example, the alternative minimum tax, the area of tax law in which the mandatory 
deduction question is almost certainly going to surface as a serious, practical problem. Congress, 
in enacting the alternative minimum tax has said, in effect, AThose taxpayers who take advantage 
of certain tax breaks, such as deductions and credits, often end up with tax liability less than we 
want it to be when we see the outcome of the computations. So, because you took advantage of 
these tax breaks, we will have you compute a different taxable income that omits certain of these 
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deductions and credits.@ If a taxpayer chooses not to take advantage of one or more of these tax 
breaks, should that taxpayer be saddled with the Acorrective measures@ of the alternative 
minimum tax? Why is it so wrong, or bad, for a taxpayer to forego a taxpayer-favored provision 
and simultaneously forego the Acorrective measure@ meted out to those taxpayers who do take 
advantage of those tax breaks? The question is, of course, rhetorical, because the answer is 
simply that it is not wrong or bad to do so, especially when there is nothing in the statute saying 
that it is prohibited. 
 
XII. CONCLUSION 
 
There is ample evidence in the statute itself that allowable deductions will go unclaimed. For 
example, the provision permitting a dependent to claim the education credit if the personal 
exemption deduction allowable with respect to the dependent is foregone by the other person 
hammers home the futility of arguing that the statute, or any other authority, compels the other 
person to claim that dependency exemption deduction. Similarly, requiring taxpayers to reduce 
adjusted basis by the amount of allowable depreciation, even though it has not been claimed, and 
exempting allowable but unclaimed depreciation from the depreciation recapture rules undercuts 
the argument that all deductions are mandatory and thus must be claimed. 
 
The few courts facing the question have not compelled taxpayers to claim all allowable 
deductions and have not provided a path to a resolution of the issue. The IRS has not acted as 
though all deductions are mandatory. Aside from a poorly drafted, and ultimately extraneous 
remark in a Chief Counsel Advice, the IRS has not purported to compel taxpayers to claim all 
allowable deductions. Only in two limited situations, for limited purposes, has the IRS taken the 
position that certain deductions must be claimed. One involves the computation of self-
employment income for social security purposes. The other involves the earned income tax credit 
issue, itself tied by cross-reference to the self-employment question. 
 
Under these circumstances, it is reasonable to conclude that a taxpayer is not required to claim an 
allowable deduction unless a statutory provision so requires, or a binding judicial precedent so 
specifies. It would be unwise, of course, to forego a deduction that the IRS considers mandatory, 
such as those claimed by self-employed individuals with respect to their self-employment, 
whether for purposes of the self-employment tax or the earned income tax credit. Until the statute 
is changed or some other binding authority is issued, there is no reason taxpayers who wish to 
forego deductions, such as the dependency exemption deduction, should hesitate in doing so. 
 
